So what are the new rules laid down by ACPO? Rule Number One is that you must use an inspectorate-recognised installation company. It's also essential to check with your insurance provider, because they often prefer a National Security Inspectorate (NSI) Quality Assured (NACOSS) company.
Rule Number Two is straightforward. Two strikes and you're down. In essence, this means that if your site 'enjoys' two or more false alarms in any one 12-month period, the police will no longer treat response to your system as a priority. They will attend site when they can.
Rule Number Three states simply that three more strikes (five in total) and you're out. If your intruder system 'false alarms' five times in a given 12-month period the police will then throw in the towel and refuse to respond at your site until you – the end user – can prove that you've sorted out all your problems.
Needless to say this is a simplified picture of ACPO's requirements, but I'm sure you're getting the message.
False alarm reducing rules
The police – who, in all fairness, have every right to complain about the current situation when there are so many demands made on their precious time – have too much to worry about already without having to get into the finer details of a modern technical alarm system. Thus they've left it to the experts at the British Standards Institution (BSI).
The BSI has committees of experts for just about everything. Committees that sit and draft the British Standards (soon to be replaced by the European Norms, of course, but that's another story).
These industry experts have decided upon a set of false alarm reducing rules or conditions to which your alarm system must adhere. That package of rules is called DD243: 2002 (the DD, by the way, stands for 'Draft for Development'). Just as a matter of interest, it probably would have been a British Standard but there's currently an agreement in place to suspend our own British Standards pending the introduction of the new Euro Standards (see 'Withdrawing BS 4737 is wrong!' and 'We must protect The Ring', SMT, April 2003, p11 and p56). Thus it's a DD for now.
If we try to reduce the long and complicated DD243:2002 into layman's terms, we find that the document's sole purpose is to eliminate costly false alarms – the main problem being customer error on entry. To do so, the powers-that-be have introduced a whole new set of rules on entry and exit, and what we call alarm "confirmation". This means that if the alarm activates the police want us to 'confirm' that the call is genuine before they'll respond.
A well-designed 'confirmed' system does remove false alarms caused by inclement weather or animals, post coming through the letterbox, draughts and other 'environmental problems' (such as fan heaters being left on).
Proving an alarm is genuine
There are three ways of proving an alarm is genuine. The first is 'audible'. For this, we have to install a set of microphones in our building so that when the alarm activates and calls for the police, the Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC, ie the monitoring officers at the other end of the telephone line) can listen in for any undue noises. If they have any reason to believe there are intruders on the premises they'll then pass the call on to the police.
Such a system has two in-built problems. One, we have to keep the big and noisy sounder quiet until the operator has had a good listen and decided on the validity of the call. As we all know, the big noisy sounder acts like an instant laxative to the thief and tends to get rid of him or her. Second, a professional thief can be so quiet that they make a mouse sound like a rampaging elephant. Audible is a good system, but not always ideal.
The second type of confirmation is visual (ie CCTV cameras dotted around to see what caused the alarm to activate in the first place). Once again, this relies on an operator in a remote location, and tends to be a rather expensive solution for the end user. This is a better system, but cameras need to be well sited, are often hidden (covert) but are also prone to vandalism in certain areas.
The third and most popular type of confirmation is 'sequential' confirmation. With this type of system, if one detector activates the alarm it will operate as normal, but the ARC operator will only inform the keyholder. Before informing the police, the ARC operator will need to wait for the second detector to activate. The objective is to eliminate all other causes of false alarm except for a moving body. If a second call is not received in 30-60 minutes then the memory of the first activation is wiped out and confirmation sequences start again.
There's now a whole new set of rules governing entry to a building, some of them being that the 'confirmation' is automatically removed upon entry. The object of the exercise is to prevent the errant keyholder from accidentally calling the police even if they forget their unsetting code and lead an army of workers through the door who fly off in different directions – tripping every detector in the place before the system can be turned off. There are differing modes of entry to allow for different situations. My advice is to listen carefully to your chosen installer.
Thorough industry research has proven beyond doubt that the biggest single cause of false alarms is end user error, usually during the setting and unsetting of systems. The sheer cost to the ratepayer has now reached the silly stage, and something has had
The designer of the alarm now has to think very carefully... If the entrance door leads directly into the main risk area, then a thief could kick down the front door (automatically removing confirmation and, therefore, police response) and enjoy free access to your company's possessions.
In the past, there has been a strong tendency for the owner of the building to tell the alarm company what's wanted. Now, in order to keep the police and your insurance company happy, you're going to have to take notice of the alarm company and be prepared to dig into your pocket a little more to get the job done right. If not, there may be no police response – and no insurance payout.
Risk assessing the building
There's another factor to consider. The police now want you – or your representatives – to complete a risk assessment on your building(s). Basically, they don't want to go galloping around your premises in the dark finding slippery oil patches, vehicle inspection pits and all manner of other potentially lethal bits of machinery – or office 'furniture' – to trip them up. Fair enough, they want to catch the thief... but they don't want to catch a cold by landing in the floor level water tank.
True, the police also want to collar the vandal, but they don't wish to break a collar bone in the process. Putting the bite on the criminal is fine. Receiving a bite from the family dog is beyond the pale. You now have to furnish any relevant information in a bid to try and protect our 'Guardians of the Law' from the hazards in and around your property.
Now for the good news. If you already have an intruder alarm system installed and it's not giving you any problems then the police say you can keep it. That is, until it starts to cause a problem. Then, after the five false alarms and the removal of police response, it's more likely that your alarm system will have to be brought up to the new 'confirmed' standard before the police will turn out again.
The advice here is not to sit and procrastinate, but to enlist the help of your alarm company as soon as possible, and make sure that members of your Security Department are brought fully up-to-speed on how to use the system. OK, it will cost a bob or two... but it will still be cheaper than having the whole system ripped out and starting again.
As far as the end user's concerned, now more than ever before it's essential to choose the right installer to keep both the police and your insurance company on side. There are only two inspectorate bodies acceptable to the police. One is the NSI, the other is the Security Systems and Alarms Inspection Board (SSAIB).
The NSI operates on two levels, the best known being the insurance-preferred NACOSS scheme – a Quality Assured (ISO 9001:2000) scheme supported by the Top 700 or 800 companies in the country who are responsible for over 80% (in value terms) of the national risk. The NSI also boasts the ICON scheme, aimed mainly at the small-to-medium-sized installer who is looking to be a future NACOSS applicant while allowing them to gain recognition suitable for their company. With this scheme, Quality Assurance is optional.
The SSAIB scheme is an amalgamation of three other schemes – the original SSAIB variant, the AISC and Integrity 2000. Collectively, they currently list around 1,200 small companies. Of those, half-a-dozen or so have gained the Quality Assured qualification.
All of these schemes are UKAS-accredited for either technical inspections or Quality Assurance – or indeed both.
Use a recognised keyholder
There is one final point that's absolutely vital for you to remember. With the new sequentially confirmed systems the first (unconfirmed) call only goes to the keyholder. This means that you or perhaps one of your staff members will have to attend without the police. There's a possibility that the first thing you meet upon entering the premises will be the thief who tripped the system. In this case, you'd be well advised to employ the services of a recognised keyholding company.
In line with the confirmation requirement, there's now a new British Standard for keyholding (BS 7984:2001). This requires all officers to be vetted, to wear a uniform (as long as those uniforms don't resemble those of the police and the army), to have sign-written vans and be fully-trained for the job at hand. Many companies are now looking at the specialist keyholding firms to attend site on their behalf, thereby not placing their own (often untrained) members of staff at risk.
The NSI already boasts a flourishing manned services division (commonly known as the Inspectorate of the Security Industry) offering vetted and inspected companies for end users. More companies are being added to that list as demand dictates.
Source
SMT
Postscript
Mike Lynskey is network manager (north) for the National Security Inspectorate. Any opinions expressed by Mike in this article are his own views, and must not in any way be considered official NSI opinion or policy
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