Shunt locks may be one answer to DD243 but modern doors present problems
It looks as though the dust is finally settling on the DD243 debate and, with any luck, this will be the last column on it for some time.

Installers are slowly getting used to it and finding their own preferences as to which options they use. The manufacturers have spent a fortune on developing new panels, features and programmes, and the great British public are just going to have to get used to the idea that things are changing and they will need to cough up a bit more for their new systems. There is, however, one debate that keeps on cropping up and that is shunt lock unsetting.

It would appear that we are in two camps on this one: those who believe that the shunt lock is the real answer (a simple idea and proven to almost eliminate false alarms) and those who believe that the shunt lock has too many problems to make it viable. The main thing we have to remember is that it needs to be designed and installed correctly, and that does not always mean taking the easy option. Perhaps it's time to have a more in-depth look at shunt locks.

Shunt lock pros and cons
The beauty of the shunt lock (as far as the supporters are concerned) is that there is no automatic removal of the confirmation upon door opening, therefore if a thief forces the door there is an instant alarm followed by a confirmed alarm soon after, according to the design of the system. This means of unsetting depends upon the fact that the staff (who may enter through another door) do not gain access before the keyholder unsets the system. Staff entering through the back door and setting off the system is exactly the sort of customer error that DD243 wishes to eliminate.

To safeguard against this then all other (non-keyholding) staff must have their keys taken from them, or, the installing company must put a shunt lock on all the external doors. Needless to say it should be common practice now to put a non-omittable contact on all external doors, emergency or not, to ensure that they are all closed and preferably locked before setting. It has been known before now for a fire door to be propped open by a fire extinguisher and forgotten about until a cat or the local kids have wandered in and set off the alarm.

So, properly designed and installed the set up is virtually foolproof, and the important words here are "properly designed and installed". Once that is established we then have three more equally important words "control of keys". At this point unless the alarm company has fitted a registered key lock and controls the number of keys available, and controls the training of the people who hold them, then they have just lost control of the security of the premises.

The control of security now falls to the less than expert customer who has a tendency to have spare keys cut by the gross and spread them around the staff like confetti at a wedding. Still, even with all 500 members of staff carrying a key and with two spares at the bank, and a third "unofficial" spare key in the till of the local early morning newsagent on the corner there should still be virtually zero false alarms upon entry. However, we all know the capability of the customer for finding ways to cock up the system. Leave the whole idea of security to them and you can start counting the days to the removal of police response.

Wires can look an eyesore
On the face of things the shunt lock may be foolproof, but there are snags. For a start most modern properties have UPVC or aluminium entry doors and these do not lend themselves to the fitting of a shunt lock that was designed for a wooden door. Even less acceptable to the customer is the wire that has to be fixed across the door complete with a flexible door loop.

"It looks a bloody eyesore," said one customer some years ago when I had just finished complimenting myself on the neatness of the job I'd done (in those days the shunt lock only disabled the entry route to allow the customer to walk in and turn off the alarm – yes THAT many years ago). Bear in mind this was the same customer who had cheerfully accepted a 6 x 2ft radiator on every wall in the house and allowed the telephone man to run a cable through the window and all round the tops of the skirting.

Fixing the wires across the UPVC and Ali doors is also a problem. Fixing locks and wires usually involves drilling holes in the door at some point and that will invalidate any guarantees that the customer may have had. I have seen the lock fitted in the doorframe to avoid the wire across the door but this usually involves getting a new set of extra long keys cut to allow for the extra width of the frame. The type of lock used is also a problem, to the best of my knowledge there are no locks manufactured specifically for UPVC and Ali doors that can be bought with a micro switch ready fitted, and ever so precious few, if any, carry the British Standard kite mark.

Another problem is that virtually every lock on sale today can be drilled to open them without a key. As a locksmith I was always proud of the fact that I could open any lock by drilling a small (only a quarter inch or so) hole that was easily filled ... most locksmiths work on the premise that the less the damage the easier it is to make good.

The thief, on the other hand, has no qualms about drilling a hole anything up to two inches in diameter. With a tank-cutter and a brace he can ruin not only the lock but the door as well. It is better therefore to always go for a British Standard lock because it will have a hardened steel plate covering the vulnerable bits of the lock. I cannot promise that it will stop the thief drilling the lock but it will make his life a lot more difficult.

With shunt locks, security can fall to the customer who has a tendency to have spare keys cut by the gross and spread them around to staff like confetti at a wedding

Cheapo locks too easy to pick
I have seen in the past some cheapo two and three lever locks that have had micro switches fitted to them, but this was mainly for indoor work like the stores and the wine cellar. I would not recommend them for an outside door because keys can be bought over the counter by quoting the number which is conveniently stamped on the key handle. Cheapo locks can also be picked using a bent wire.

DD243 does not specify the type of lock to be fitted but I would always go for the British Standard (BS 3621) lock because of the hardened steel anti-drill plate and the extreme skill and specialist tools needed to pick the lock. The BS lock also has to have a minimum of five levers giving 1,000 effective differs (meaning that only one key in 1,000 will fit the lock). Many non-BS five lever locks have less that 1,000 differs, the three lever has around 100 differs and with the real cheapo two lever lock you can count the differs on the various bits of your anatomy.

At the end of the day I cannot really advise you on which unsetting method to use because I have not seen the installation, but if you opt for the shunt lock for unsetting and you want my advice (and, being a typical Yorkshireman I have a tendency to give it whether you want it or not), do not skimp on your security, pay up and buy the right tool for the job.

Ken's panel was a life saver
On a slightly different tack, I had a phone call the other day from Ken Bentley, one of my industry heroes. I call him my hero because the Bentley control panels virtually saved my company from going down the pan. The brand I was using at the time (supposedly a market leader) was giving me numerous false alarms, I changed to Bentley panels and all my problems disappeared overnight. Since becoming an inspector I have heard many people confirm that Bentley panels were rock steady and trouble free, and they would use nothing else.

However time moves on and Ken sold up and retired, and, sad to say, the new Bentley panel would crash for no good reason, it was then only a few years until the Bentley company closed, and 20 years of Bentley reputation went with it.

A few years ago Ken discovered that all the leftover stock from the old company was still in storage so he bought it and re-started the old KJ Bentley company again ... and there are still enough of the old Bentley users out there for Ken to sell all he can produce.

However, the real reason for his call was that he had read my column in the November issue where I described the idea of using a box bolted to the wall outside the shop as a means of solving the DD243 problem of the thief kicking in the exit door and removing the confirmation and therefore cancelling the police response.

Just to remind you ... the idea grew out of a conversation I had with a local shopkeeper where I was trying to explain the principles of DD243 and confirmation. We arrived at the idea of making a steel box to go on his wall outside the front door. Inside the box was a keypad for the alarm, a final exit contact on the box door, a vibration detector and a back-tamper switch to protect against drilling and vandal damage and a means of securing the main entrance door to the building, (in this case a bar across the door with a padlock inside the box).

To unset the system you open the door on the box, (cancelling the confirmation) turn off the alarm and release the lock on the shop door. If anyone forces the shop door it will give instant bells followed by a fast confirmation. If anyone tries to force the box on the wall the vibro gives instant alarm, followed by confirmation if the box comes off the wall or the door is forced open.

At this point the police are on their way and the intruders have still to start breaking into the shop. If it is just plain vandalism then the instant bells should get rid of them. The real trick is to ensure that the customer is locked out of his own premises until the box has been opened and the confirmation removed to eliminate the false alarm upon entry.

My only reservation was the look of a metal box on the wall. The answer came from Ken who suggested it was made to look like one of those decorative post boxes you can buy in garden centres, and I think that's just right.