In the wake of a damning US Federal Aviation Administration report into security standards on American airlines, David Mackay examines the reasons why aviation security provisions are now somewhat worse than they were three decades ago
The tragic events of last September focused the world's attention on airport security. Standards at US airports have rightly been criticised but, prior to those attacks on Washington and New York, the number of 'air incidents' worldwide had actually declined. For its part, the International Civil Aviation Organisation recorded no fatalities in 1997 or 1998 – but that was clearly a false dawn.

The British Airports Authority runs the major airports in the UK, of course, proudly declaring that "safety and security processes at our airports are among the best in the world". Judging by recent events, though, that claim can be seen to be somewhat hollow.

Back in 1999, an inspector carried a deadly weapon through security control at Edinburgh International Airport. In October 2000, inspectors ferried a handgun and a fake bomb through security checks at London Stansted Airport. Although the metal detector alarm was activated, security staff on duty failed to find the weapon.

More recently, both the recognised daily newspapers and targeted City titles like The London Evening Standard have revealed that baggage handlers at Heathrow have been flouting the screening rules by failing to search bags manually.

Disturbing though they are, these incidents are overshadowed when compared with serious breaches of security in the US.

In the past few weeks, the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has published a damning report detailing the results of hundreds of checks carried out at 32 US airports. Apparently, screening staff failed to spot 70% of knives, 60% of fake bombs and 30% of guns smuggled through by undercover inspectors. Make no mistake. Airport security Stateside is now worse than it was 30 years ago. Will we ever learn?

A lack of knowledge
This woeful security record has now generated mass neurosis over possible terrorist attacks. Repeated warnings and heavy Government fines appear to have made little difference. The current security fiasco therefore comes as no surprise, as all the previous reports have highlighted the problems of employing low-paid, poorly-trained airport security staff – many of whom are not security screened. This has led to difficulties with checking passengers and their carry-on baggage, as well as a poor knowledge of security screening equipment and how it works.

In its civil aviation strategic plan for 2001-2004, the FAA set out the goal of 'no successful attacks against US aviation'. To achieve this, it committed to becoming a more security-minded organisation, and placed a particular emphasis on retaining the best possible workforce to do so.

Since October 1998, the FAA has indeed handed down substantial penalties (totalling more than $1 million) for major security breaches found to exist on seven US airlines. These breaches included inadequate security procedures in controlled terminal space, non-display of ID badges by employees and contractors, failure to carry out essential background checks on employees and thorough passenger ID checks, and a failure to ask the appropriate security questions with respect to checked bags.

Evidence would suggest that lax security standards are part and parcel of the aviation culture across the water. In a three-month period in 2000, more than 300 security breach penalties were imposed by the FAA, and airline operators were fined $1.5 million. On average, both United Airlines and American Airlines were fined every week for basic security failures. Staggering.

Here in the UK we operate 100% hold baggage screening procedures. That's not the case in the US, where it's limited to one item per 10,000 on domestic flights. UK hand baggage is screened by x-ray equipment, and passengers are also subjected to hand searches and metal detector scrutiny. Such levels of screening are not used in the US, as became apparent in the last few months when a passenger boarded an aircraft at Washington DC carrying knives and assorted other weapons.

Maintaining the status quo
In spite of the World Trade Centre catastrophe, little seems to have changed. Spokespersons for US cabin crew have complained that security measures are purely cosmetic. More worryingly, perhaps, they pointed out that while pilots, cabin staff and passengers are screened pre-boarding, ground crew and others are allowed access to aircraft without similar checks being required.

Post-September 11th, the sheer scale of the problem was revealed when America's largest airport security contractor was barred from working in Massachusetts for "persistent incompetence". Owned by Securicor, Argenbright boasts a 19,000-strong workforce and employs 40% of all US airport screening staff. At some airports it has a staff turnover rate of 400%. Lamentable. In a bid to turn the tide, Securicor has now replaced the previous chief executive and raised hourly wages. Let's see if such moves have the desired effect.

In the aftermath of last September's attacks, President Bush has authorised an immediate grant of $3 billion to improve aviation security. In tandem, US Government officials have begun re-instituting the domestic 'sky marshals' programme (which provides specially-trained and armed teams of FAA civil aviation security specialists for anti-hijacking missions worldwide).

Meantime, the Federal Transportation Secretary has formed a Working Group to re-write existing security manuals – although the US will surely have to look outside its own borders for evidence of best practice.

Perhaps this may result in the adoption of the UK's multi-layered security model to be enforced across Europe under the auspices of the European Civil Aviation Conference.

The time has come for aviation security to be given a much higher priority and profile. Otherwise, the international economy can only continue to suffer.