fraser’s report into the farce at holyrood really sticks the boot into bovis. the company always knew the programme was unachieveable, IT says. but ceo john spanswick refutes the findings, adamant his boys did nothing wrong. kristina smith spoke to bovis’ boss man

Last month Lord Fraser published the findings of his inquiry into what happened at Holyrood. In it he criticised construction manager Bovis Lend Lease for the over-optimistic programmes it repeatedly presented to the client. Bovis knew from day one that the programme was unachievable, says Fraser, but chose to ignore this because of the political will for an early completion.

Was it unethical for Bovis to take on a project it knew couldn’t be completed in time? “No, not at all,” chief executive John Spanswick told CM. In response to Fraser’s findings, Spanswick firmly rejects any criticisms of his firm. It was the client’s fault, he insisted, for failing to take timely decisions. “I don’t think there was any reason for us to suppose there wouldn’t be a robust decision-making process when we started,” he said.

Construction Management works well on complex projects, he says, with a strong client. How could Bovis have foreseen what the project would become, he asks, pointing to factors like the tripling of floor space, the additional blast-proofing introduced part way through and fantastically high specifications such as the £4,000 per square metre cladding on the SMP’s accommodation block.

The nearest Spanswick comes to admitting any error on Bovis’ part is when he is asked to consider what he would do differently, granted the gift of hindsight. “I suppose if we started over again we would be a bit tougher with the client and say, ‘look, you really have to listen to us and your other advisers about the implications of the decisions that you are making’ (or in some cases are not making).”

But what about this over-optimistic programming? Fraser says of Alan Mack, Bovis’ project director: “Mr Mack has been consistently bullish in reporting to the HPG [Holyrood Progress Group] about the programmes for the project, but had repeatedly been shown to be over-optimistic.”

Realistic, insists Spanswick, not optimistic, because each programme came with conditions attached: you’ll get it on this date providing you make this decision, providing that information is in place. “In some ways it would have been easy just to say ‘well, it’s going to take another year’. The art of programming is to reflect the current circumstances and advise the client of the implications of where he stands at any particular moment. If there’s a decision to be made on specification or timing or costs, then it’s the construction manager’s job to say ‘these are the implications if you don’t make those decisions’.

“It does rely on decision-makers within the client being able to understand that issue and clearly they didn’t.”

If we started over again, we would be tougher with the client and say ‘you really should listen to us’

John Spanswick, Bbovis

Clearly they didn’t. So couldn’t Bovis have done something about that, when time after time Mack came to the table and said, ‘you need to decide on... x, y, z’ and it didn’t happen?

“If it subsequently doesn’t happen, I don’t think Alan Mack or anyone else should be blamed,” said Spanswick. “He might take the view after it’s happened two or three times that ‘are we ever going to get the information?’ but I don’t think there was any more that he or anybody could have done to improve that situation.”

The palace’s legacy

Whatever Spanswick’s view, though, Bovis has been condemned in writing by Fraser. It can’t have enhanced the contractor’s reputation. On this point, too Spanswick is predictably upbeat. Bovis has a track record for building landmark buildings around the world and this is another feather in its cap, he says. “There’s been examples in the past of historic buildings which have taken a lot of time and people have said cost too much money but never-the-less they are part of our country and part of our history and heritage. And I am sure the Scottish Parliament is going to come into that category.”

So it’s a case of ‘je ne regrette rien’? Not quite. Spanswick is sorry for the intense pressure his people have come under. So desperate has the Scottish press been to secure the next Holyrood scoop that some team members have had journalists camped out at their family homes. But everyone has held up and soldiered on, another Bovis tradition, said Spanswick. “It would have been the easiest thing in the world for them individually and for us as a company to say ‘look, we have just had enough of this’ and draw a line under it. But Bovis has a reputation for not walking away from adversity.”

The Fraser Report: who is to blame?

  • The original figure of £40m or £50m which was mooted to the Scottish public could never have been enough to construct a parliament building of “original and innovative” design. The final price? A mammoth £413m.

  • The then first minister Donald Dewar (who died in 2000) decided to go ahead with a new parliament building on the Holyrood site rather than go for a temporary solution and wait for the MSPs to be elected. Fraser admits he was entitled to take that decision at the time.

  • The Scottish Office officials interpreted their task as getting the thing built early to a high quality. “That inevitably meant that whatever lip-service was paid to it, the cost of the building took a back seat.”

  • The selection of Construction Management as the form of contract was “the single factor to which most of the misfortunes that have befallen the project can be attributed” according to Fraser.

  • Barbara Doig, civil servant and project sponsor was incompetent, says Fraser. She couldn’t give a reason why she had readmitted Bovis to the bidding process, apart from the fact that she had heard good things about the firm’s work. (For the record, Bovis says it was never told that it had been dropped from the tender list, so it wasn’t readmitted and that Fraser never questioned them on this point). And Doig didn’t have enough knowledge about construction either.

  • Spanish architect Enric Miralles and Edinburgh practice RMJM didn’t gel ‘culturally’. There was poor communication between the architects and other team members too. Fraser speculated if Miralles (who died in 2000) ever appreciated time and cost restraints.

  • Civil servants withheld all sorts from Ministers. They didn’t involve ministers in the decision to choose Construction Management, let alone advise them that this meant they (as the client) shouldered all the risk. They neglected to tell Ministers about risk items identified by DLE which would have raised the construction cost from £62m to £89m in 1999. They forgot to tell ministers when the project manager Bill Armstrong had resigned.

  • DLE should have rung alarm bells with the client when it saw that designs were being developed which were busting the budget.

  • The programme was over optimistic to start with and Bovis reported to the client with a degree of optimism which often was not justified. “...it is my view that Bovis, in constructing its programmes probably appreciated as well as anybody the buildability consequences of the highly complex and non-standard designs which were emerging from the Design Team. In my view, their programme reflected the political imperative for early completion. Bovis reported to the client with a degree of optimism which was often not justified.”

  • The effect of the post-September 11 security measures being introduced has been much exaggerated. The building should have incorporated these measures anyway from day one.

    To read the whole report, and transcripts of the inquiry, visit www.holyroodinquiry.org

    • Source

    Construction Manager