Close the loophole

We can now get a URN (Police Unique Reference Number), and therefore a direct police response to a CCTV system. However, to get that URN and the direct police response, we need to work to the new BS 8418. This is a very good standard, long awaited by those within the industry – but is it "a bridge too far"?

I say this because to get that official response a company has to be inspectorate recognised, has to be screened and vetted to the eyeballs. It has to be management checked to ensure compliance with the requirements of UKAS, has to install to the new standard, and finally the signals have to be monitored by a recognised ARC. Then, and only then, will the police issue a URN. And after all that there has to be a risk assessment before the URN is confirmed.

Then there are the unofficial corner cutters ... straight out of jail, bought a load of cheap kit at a car boot sale and set up the CCTV to transmit to an unregistered monitoring station set up in the back bedroom of a house on the local council estate. If the "watcher" in between his (or her) fag and coffee breaks just happens to see a movement, they dial 999 and say "we can see intruders on the premises" the police have to attend because it is a "confirmed" alarm.

Somewhere in the set-up of our industry and our relations with the police we have got it wrong, big style, and left a loophole big enough to drive a coach and horses through, and it needs closing.

Changing my tune

Let me say that from the outset I support the new standard and I support anything which shoves the great and the good into doing the job right and getting the right people to "watch the birdie". Equally, I have always supported the right of the man in the street to dial 999 and get help if he needs it, but I am changing my tune more and more with the passing years.

Back during my days as a fireman in the late 60s – early 70s I was regularly sent out with the rest of my crew to attend to false calls. Many were just malicious, rung in by kids who had got fed up with breaking windows, or the "educationally challenged" sector of our society who got a kick from seeing a big red fire engine. On the other hand there were also the "false alarm but good intent" calls where people had just made a mistake. A smell of burning, a bit of smoke from a garden bonfire and the general public often reached for the phone before finding the true cause. The "good intent" calls were always accepted with good grace and a smile to the errant caller with the advice "better safe than sorry”. But can we do that today in the alarm industry? The answer is NO.

False alarms in our industry have run at unacceptably high levels for far too long, I am sure we all agree on that. I am also sure that a very large percentage of those false calls could be deemed as "good intent". I have yet to come across an alarm (or CCTV) company that has deliberately set up their systems to give false alarms and have the police running around for no good reason, but that is exactly what we have done – albeit with "good intent".

The police have dropped on us like a ton of bricks, and can we blame them? We have had DD243 rammed up our... well, we won’t go into that – but eventually we got what we deserved in more ways than one.

After the uproar about DD243 had died down, we came to realise that it is in fact a good standard and it IS working. Now we have the chance to do the same with CCTV.

BS 8418 is a tough standard and it is going to take the industry some time to get our heads round it. It does, however, contain a lot of obvious good advice, like the requirement to set stops on the pan and tilt to ensure that the viewer cannot (inadvertently or not) be allowed to look over the wall into someone else's property, or to ensure that the detectors cannot "see" more than the camera, therefore creating problems and doubts for the viewing ARC.

We even have the facility for "talk-back" where the watcher can talk directly to the trespasser and offer him (or her) some "sound" advice (usually ending with "off"), the general intention being much the same as the bells only alarm – frighten them off before they take anything or do any more damage. This brings us to look at the comparisons between the two method of deterrent.

Different parties, different needs

Somewhere in the set-up of our industry and our relations with the police we have got it wrong

For this we have to look first at the differing needs of the interested parties. The insurance companies wish to reduce their losses, and the police want to get a hold on a collar. You could say that one lot wants the criminal "off site" – the other wants the criminal to stay there until caught.

As regards intruder systems (bells only) we have always considered them to be an effective deterrent. The sight of a box on the wall is often enough to send the would-be thief elsewhere. The sound of an alarm firing up has an effect on the thief much the same as a large dose of California Syrup of Figs, and shall we say it severely encourages him (or her) to speed up or curtail their activities and get the hell out of there before anyone starts looking and investigating the cause of the noise.

This is fine as far as the property owner and the insurance company is concerned, because they have a common goal – if you can't prevent or deter the break-in, do what you can to reduce the losses and damage by getting rid of the thief ASAP. The police, as we know, have a different slant on it. If they are to go and risk life and limb dashing round the streets of our fair cities chasing after activating alarms, then they want to feel a collar or two, and you can't blame them. They want good accurate info and nothing to alert the thief, so they can dash round and catch them in the act. But times have changed. The police (and I am sure they would be the first to admit it) now have their resources so tightly stretched that they can no longer guarantee a response in time to catch the thief in the act, so most, if not all, forces have now dropped the requirement for a ten minute bell delay. In other words, the property owner is now out on his own to defend their property as best he (or she) can.

The first line of defence, as always, is the intruder alarm. It will deter the opportunist if he sees the bell box and frighten him off if he misses the box and trips the system. However, as the risk levels go up, so does the incentive to "chance your arm" with the intruder system, and we move out of the opportunist market and into the determined "case it and turn it over" market.

At this point we come to the common goal; if we can't stop them and we can't prevent the losses then we want to see them punished. I always think that the addition of a large lump on the cranium applied with a baseball bat followed by the temporary removal of daylight is a good start. After that a swift trip to the courts where the miscreants are made to empty out their pockets and pay for the damage, pay for the losses and have a fair lump extracted for compensation would be a suitable follow up.

I fully realise that this is a form of utopia that cannot be allowed to come to pass. This would swing the pendulum from crime pays to crime doesn't pay and the thieves would quit their profession in droves, and we (the security industry) would be out of work. I have long been convinced that our upright, honest and truth extolling politicians who campaign long and loud (well, not TOO long and not TOO loud) about reducing crime in this country are actually convinced that a goodly chunk of crime and disorder is required to keep the dole queues down, which is why they bleat and bark but steadfastly refuse to bite. However, I digress, and the public have to foot the bill, either in direct losses or increased insurance premiums. Changing times need changing means, so, may I present (large fanfare) BS 8418. We now have a new tool in the box. It combines detection, warning, signalling, police response, and if specified correctly, recorded evidence to use in court. But there is a price, and the end user is just going to have to learn to pay. They are going to pay anyway in losses following theft, so we have to find the right level of detection and response to cover a given risk.

Specifying it right

Now, more than ever, our industry is going to be pushed "up-market", and the need for specifying the right camera, the right sound system and the right ARC to view and monitor the calls will be vital. First we need to be sure that the cameras are capable of producing pictures that are clear enough and large enough to be used as evidence in court, and that there are enough cameras to cover the risk. If the cameras are on towers then the towers need to be rigid and not swaying like a long car aerial.

The detectors need to be able to cover the area fully and not just strategic bits. The cameras are going to need to be able to see ALL the area covered by detectors so that the ARC can pick up and monitor an intruder right from the start. The "talk-back" sound system is going to need plenty of power and lots of good quality speakers. All too often I hear systems that are tinny, crackly and so overloaded that they sound like cheap transistor radios. Ask yourself this – would you be impressed by a tinny, muffled, fuzzy speaker telling you to leave, or would you stick two fingers up to the nearest camera with a short two word answer? On the other hand if the voice was clear, loud and firm, and it was saying that they now had enough recorded evidence to identify you and bring you to justice and the police had been called – would you still be as defiant or would you bolt in fear?

It has always been said that the ability to convince your opponent of your ability is more important than having to prove it, and the sound system on a CCTV response installation is a classic example. You need power, not for volume but for the spread and quality. A classic example is the Walkman on the train – the sound is thin, tinny and even though it is reasonably quiet, it gets right up your nose.

To finally get to the point, we now have the opportunity and the standard to provide a good detection system, with evidence gathering. This is all at a good price that we can make a reasonable profit on, and one that will be virtually false alarm free. All we need now is for the police to back us to the hilt and kick the unofficial corner cutters out of the game.

* Mike Lynskey is a former proprietor and independent inspector of alarm systems. He is now network manager with the NSI. The personal views expressed should not be taken as the opinions of the NSI. Email Mike on: mike.lynskey@virgin.net