Birmingham's resounding rejection made stock transfer about as popular as the Argentinian football team. But in Glasgow, it was a big hit – so what did they do wrong? Chris Wheal reports on transfer tactics
Stock transfers have plummeted to the bottom of the list of preferred options at councils all over Britain since the massive rejection at Birmingham. Leeds is pressing ahead with its arm's-length management company; Hull has postponed plans for a transfer ballot next March after its ruling Liberal Democrat majority was ousted in May's local election; Sheffield has appealed to the government for help avoiding a full transfer; and Newcastle insists all options are being considered but commentators reckon transfer is the least popular.

Yet despite this surge in unpopularity, experts and past practitioners insist large-scale voluntary transfers can and do work.

Looking at the differences between the successful Glasgow ballot and the abject failure of Birmingham's is a good start. The transfers were of similar size with similar amounts of repairs required over remarkably similar timescales yet the two could not have been more different. Public subsidy for Glasgow's transfer was much higher, the rent guarantees better, the political unity in favour stronger, the messages better presented and the opposition much more divided.

"What you saw in Birmingham was a textbook case of tenants and trade unionists uniting behind a single claim," says Mark Weeks of Defend Council Housing. "That never happened in Glasgow. There was a campaign by Unison, by the TUC, three tenant campaigns and one by the Socialist Party.

"It had all the ingredients, but disparate groups were not fighting under the same umbrella."

It wasn't that simple, though, says Gwyneth Taylor, head of housing at the Local Government Association. "The deal in Birmingham wasn't good enough from the tenants' perspective compared with the perceived risks. You can say exactly the same thing to two different audiences and get two totally different reactions. You have to know what the drivers are for them rather than the most important thing for you."

Anthony Mason, PricewaterhouseCoopers' housing team director, agrees that each transfer is different, and flags contrasts between north and south, shire and urban, old transfers and new.

Lessons fron the past
Differences aside, however, some key lessons apply to all. Bob Hind, chief executive of Paradigm Housing Group, which runs the Chiltern Hundreds HA – the first ever LSVT in December 1988 – says consulting with tenants was as vital then as it is now. "What was important was explaining the rationale for transfer to the tenants and their advocates in a language that was honest, unambiguous and touched the issues that were of direct concern to them," he says.

Malcolm Temple, director of housing consultant Beha Williams Norman, says a council needs to carry out a thorough appraisal of the options, including investment needs and resources required, and must involve tenants in reaching the stock transfer conclusion. David Hall, executive director at Hacas Chapman Hendy, agrees: "Involve tenants when you are looking at the options before you have decided on transfer. You can't involve all of them, but get the tenant leaders in and then take the agreed consultation document to a wider audience."

Defend Council Housing claims it stopped many transfers even going to ballot because it could be shown that they were just a quick-fix option being forced on tenants by the council.

Political unity is also seen as a crucial part of a transfer game plan. If a council is split on the issue, forget it, says Keith Beardmore, deputy city treasurer at Sunderland council. And he should know. Sunderland achieved the best ballot result in the country with an 88% "yes" vote on a 73% turnout. "The council was convinced it was the best option," he says. "Once we got into the process, the full implications were understood by all the parties. There was clear political leadership and consistency across the council."

Council unity is a point picked up on by Howard Farrand, chief executive of Whitefriars Housing Group, which took 20,000 units from Coventry council in a stock transfer in September 2000 (see inset, page 18). "In Birmingham they had ward councillors joining the anti brigade and campaigning against the transfer. If people are unsure, they vote to stay as they are," he says. And political will cannot be disguised, as some of the dithering councils are proving. "Many, many councils have only gone for transfer to get out of the financial bind," says Farrand, "and it gets to the point where the tenant loses out. Councillors are having their fingers prised off housing – they don't want to let go but they have no choice."

It's not just politicians' attitudes that count; having the council staff on board can make a huge difference too. Weeks claims Unison in Birmingham had made clear its opposition to transfer nearly two years in advance and had threatened to strike if any member was asked to pound the streets urging a "yes" vote.

Indeed, there may be several opposition groups, says Farrand, and councils should be prepared to counter any misinformation about how staff will be treated, for instance. "If you talk to our staff, you will find their pay and conditions are better, their working conditions are better, their opportunities are better. It's more exciting, they are providing a better service and they are involved in discussions about how to improve that. It's a culture change," he says. Hacas' Hall also says that staff reactions have been positive. "If you talk to staff who have transferred, it's liberating for them. Instead of being in an organisation that is losing stock, they are working for an organisation that is investing in new stock."

Tackling tenant concerns
Tenants have their own worries – not least rents and tenancy agreements – and councils need to deal with these sensitively. "The big concern was that the tenancy was no longer secure," says Farrand, "so we put a lot of time into doorstepping, especially the old people who were afraid, and explained how small the differences were."

If tenants are unsure, they vote to stay as they are

Howard Farrand, Whitefriars Housing Group

With rent restructuring taking place throughout social housing, old divisions should end and a single tenancy for social housing tenants put a stop to these concerns.

One tenant concern less easily avoided is fear of privatisation. "An LSVT is a private-sector landlord in legal terms," says the LGA's Taylor. "The people I used to deal with when I was first involved in council housing were moved out of horrendous [private] conditions into council houses, and people still have that fear of private landlords."

The council's job is to dispel the myth that transfer is the same as privatisation to a greedy, profit-hungry landlord. Campaigners must focus on the positive benefits that transfer can bring. However, Hall sounds a cautionary note about empty promises: "You have to demonstrate that transfer will deliver more resources. Some people thought the Birmingham proposal was just too good to be true – people are so used to political promises that don't mean anything."

Communication is vital. "We had a series of well-advertised public meetings, individual, group or estate meetings, newsletters and staff engaging the subject with every tenant contact," says Hind, of the Chiltern Hundreds transfer. "The turnouts and issues raised were monitored, repeat meetings were promoted where attendance was low, and messages were clarified in response to feedback."

Boardman from Sunderland recounts how the further the transfer progressed, the more tactically the game was played. "It was rather like a campaign with a high public profile, so the message got across," he says.

Tactical campaigning ought to be familiar to any councillor who has had to fight a marginal seat. "We sectored our vote," explains Farrand. "We realised that every time we went to the press, they gave Dave Nellist [former Militant Labour MP] equal column inches to us, so we stopped going to the press and started to campaign on the doorstep.

We knocked on every door and analysed the result. If they were a 'no, not in a million years' we left them. If they were a 'yes' vote we made a reminder visit. If they were a 'don't know' we put in a lot of effort."

Hall thinks communication tactics should be tailored to suit the area. "Having meetings sometimes works but there have been low attendances in recent years. Having a surgery where people can drop in, or a telephone helpline with good advisers, can work better," he says.

Conspiracy theories
There is a cynical view that Birmingham was the fall guy for the rest of local government; that councils needed a big LSVT failure to force the government to give them other options, such as arm's-length housing companies and securitisation (allowing councils to borrow against future rental income streams).

But PricewaterhouseCoopers' Mason disagrees, claiming local politicians would not have put so much time and effort into the transfer knowing it was going to fail, especially those that paid the political price. "Dennis Minnis, the lead member for housing, lost his seat because of this," Mason says. But he adds: "It's not unreasonable to say to the government 'if you want to achieve decent homes by 2010, you are going to have to look at alternatives to transfer'."

In the anti-transfer camp, one RSL boss goes as far as to say that councils are too political to run housing well. "The councillors on the board of an RSL act in a very businesslike way and act on the facts, not the politics. Councils are very good at manipulating arm's-length companies so they effectively become control companies."

Clive Barnett, head of housing finance at Royal Bank of Scotland, thinks it unlikely the government will change its mind on transfers because, in general, they work. "Gordon Brown has other priorities for his cash, such as the NHS, and he also knows that in the housing sector the private sector is working. He's not going to change that," he says.

In case transfer sounds like an easy option, Farrand, of Coventry's Whitefriars, has a warning about giving away too much as part of the desperate drive to secure a ballot victory. "You're putting in either baths or showers and this little chap asks if he can have a shower over the top of his bath. You say yes because you want to win the vote and then you realise that, with over 20,000 homes, that's an extra £5m," he says. Luckily Whitefriars has managed to save that money through partnership agreements with its suppliers and by using innovative materials and technology in its refurbishments.

Crunching the numbers

Glasgow will have debt totalling £900m that the Treasury will have to write off. The Scottish Executive will also throw in £400m that it would otherwise have had to give to Glasgow council to service that debt. A panel of some of the most active lenders in the sector, including Royal Bank of Scotland, Halifax Bank of Scotland, Nationwide, Royal Bank of Canada and the European Investment Bank, was called in to advise on the deal from an early stage and forced through changes to the financial structure of the deal that will make private sector involvement possible. One major change the banks inspired is that the Scottish Executive will find a further £300m in “repayable grant” to plug the gap between the public funding already available and the amount of risk banks were prepared to accept. Under the deal now, a total of £1.6bn of public money will go into the scheme. Such huge sums are still worth it for the government if they mean levering in £731m of private finance (peak debt in year 12 and all paid back after 25 years). Birmingham was very different. Unusually, one lender, RBS, had been lined up in advance to underwrite and arrange £1.042bn of lending. The usual suspects would all have grabbed big slices. But, crucially, the Birmingham plan had just £600m of government debt write-off and, with no regional equivalent of the Scottish Executive, little in the way of additional publicly financed support, meaning its protagonists could not offer the same rent guarantees as in Glasgow. Glasgow’s rents will be pegged to inflation for five years and inflation plus 1% for the following three years. The council says there is a planning assumption that rents will rise no more than inflation plus 1% for the full 30 years, but there is no such guarantee. In Birmingham the rent rises were to be fixed at inflation plus 0.5% plus a maximum of £2 for the first five years, with the same projected but not guaranteed for the following five years.

Transfer tips

Whitefriars chief executive Howard Farrand gives post-transfer advice.
  • Although the finances were not finalised until after the vote, I recommend getting the basics right early on. We sought headline guarantees from Halifax, which meant Whitefriars knew it could go ahead. Once the transfer went through, the debt was split between lenders at better rates. Most important is getting the insurance underwritten early – and that means getting environmental assessments done right at the beginning.
  • To demonstrate commitment to staff – and to lenders and other stakeholders – get senior appointments in place from day one.
  • To get tenants onside, appoint a powerful tenants’ friend rather than a toothless stooge.
  • The key is to personalise the transfer rather than present it as a repeat of a successful formula elsewhere. “Your consultant will bring you a template, but you have to personalise it. It’s like a baton race. The consultant comes in running, but very quickly you need to get your hand on that baton and very soon after that the consultant has to let go.”
  • Lastly, a warning: “Mind the gap.” To get a successful ballot you have to raise expectations, then after the vote you have to meet those expectations very quickly. “The day after, you will get a call from someone saying ‘where’s my new bathroom then?’ We put in new windows immediately because that was the easiest thing to do. And everything we do we badge with the Whitefriars logo, so they know we are delivering our promises.”