The seminars were considered by all to be a resounding success but the interesting thing for us were the question and answer sessions. The first surprise was to find out just how well informed many of the insurance people were on the finer points of DD 243, so much so that there were complaints that the installers did not fully understand it themselves and this was borne out by the lack of suitable information tuning up on their desks in the specifications submitted.
Don't make blanket statements
Looking from the insurance point of view I have to concede that they have a point. Lack of full and comprehensive information is probably one of the greatest failings of the installer. First off, I was surprised to find that the insurance assessors were quite familiar with types and makes of equipment, particularly passives, and they were quick to frown on quotations that turned up specifying cheap or inappropriate kit. They prefer to see a specified exact location as opposed to the blanket statement "final location to be agreed between installer and customer at the time of installation".
The specified height of the detector was another complaint: they would like to see a quoted height for a detector instead of "ceiling height" or "at manufacturer's recommended height". As one assessor put it: "I want to see if he knows what he is playing at, and uninformative blanket statements only tell me he doesn't".
Let's face it, when they are sitting in an office trying to decide on underwriting a risk, the one thing they need is good accurate information and when they don't get it they tend to vote with their feet and go elsewhere.
Currently, one of the main complaints is the apparent lack of understanding about signalling specifications and confirmation. Far too many installers are still specifying only one transmission path for a confirmed system, and as more than one assessor pointed out, the installers don't seem to realise that if the first activation is a cut telephone line and there is no second (back-up) line of communication then you have just wiped out all signalling and removed the police response. There will never be a second confirmation call. It is worse still when the penny drops and they realise that even the first call only works with a RedCARE or other monitored line. With an ordinary "bog-standard" digi no one ever gets the first call, let alone the second confirmation call.
Far too many specifications are landing on a desk in an insurance office with little or no information about the communication to be used. Many are just stating that calls will be passed to an ARC and that is that. Far too few specify the type of signalling and far too few state that a system is confirmed, even though it is.
The insurer has no other choice that to assume the lowest levels and they are just bouncing the spec back as totally unacceptable ... and I am forced to agree with them. It is quite clear that although many installers are getting their heads round the implications of DD 243, they are failing miserably when it comes to updating their specifications to match. So, if I may put out a plea on behalf of the insurance world it is "get your specs right or we'll give the job to someone else".
Another point that cropped up was the "line fail" warning. Many installers are fitting panels that tell the customer there is a line fault and the customer is just ignoring the message and setting the system anyway. This may be lack of understanding on the part of the system operator, or worse, it could be bloody mindedness. But the end result is the automatic removal of police response (no signals getting out) and, in many cases where police response is a condition of insurance, it is the automatic removal of insurance cover into the bargain.
Here again we are looking at a severe shortfall in the training of the end user, once again a source of complaint from the insurance world. All too often they fail to grab the implications of their actions, or they were instructed (second hand) by another member of the staff and not fully informed or trained. At this point I will get back on one of my old soapboxes and say that I believe no one should be allowed to set or unset a system until they have been fully trained (and that training documented) by the alarm company. Perhaps I could throw this back to the insurers and say that if it were a condition of insurance that all key-holders and operators had to be trained and certificated we may just have a sudden drop in user-related false alarms followed by a reduction in the number of systems taken off response.
Unsetting is upsetting
The insurance world has a much more simplistic answer – programme the panel so that it cannot be set until the line fault is cleared. It would solve that specific problem. This also brings up another problem ... as pointed out by a visitor to the NSI stand at IFSEC. One particular remote reset device works by putting a fault on the system and not removing it until the correct code has been applied. This is fine until you add confirmation to the system. What happens now is that the system sees an activation and signals it on a code 3, the remote reset device picks up the code 3 signal and puts a lockout fault on the system (usually by putting a spare zone open circuit). This has the unfortunate effect of creating an immediate second fault and confirming itself automatically every time. How this problem is going to be solved I'm not sure, but this type of remote reset blows a big hole in the validity of confirmation.
It’s clear that although many installers are getting their heads around the implications of DD 243, they are failing miserably when it comes to updating their specifications
The insurance world is also very unhappy with some of the new unsetting methods that are acceptable to DD 243. The very idea that opening (not unlocking) the door automatically removes the confirmation leaves them in a complete tizzy. As one rather forthright underwriter put it to me: "Do they really think we are going to give cover to a system that can be written off by some goon with size ten boots and no brain? They must think we are fresh off the boat".
There is unhappiness at various levels about the shunt lock unsetting the system – too easy to defeat by picking or drilling the lock. They are even less happy about the 30-60 minutes maximum time window between the first and the confirmation call, after which the confirmation is cancelled and the system reverts back to stage one again. It is too easy for a thief to activate the system, check the response time of the keyholder and sit and wait for the confirmation time to elapse. The thief creates his own "time window" in which to turn over the premises.
As with all these things, much depends upon intelligent use and specification of equipment and the comprehensive training of the user/key holder. You could say that the whole thing relies on the installer not cutting corners, even under pressure from customers to keep the costs down.
However, one complaint stood out way above the rest – selling the confirmation system. This has cropped up now too many times to be ignored, and the insurance world is still not sure if it is done out of ignorance of the rules or a god-given chance for the installer to make a fast bob or two.
The complaint is that some installers are telling the customer that their systems no longer meet the new ACPO and DD 243 requirements and have to be updated to meet the confirmation requirements. No doubt many installers have the best interests of the customer at heart by getting the system updated before it causes a problem. Others will see it as a way to sell a load more kit and a new control panel.
You may as well take very careful note that if you update a system from first response to confirmed response when the system was not having any problems in the first place, you are dropping the police response down from the first call to the second (confirmation call) and are very likely to find yourself in hot water with the insurance company. As was very strongly pointed out to me, all for the sake of making a fast buck on an unnecessary update, an alarm company can seriously damage a customer's police response situation and therefore dramatically increase the likelihood of a heavy claim.
You'll get the blame
If this happens and it can be proved that a system was "updated" to confirmed response without good reason, then the insurance company would be very unwilling to pay out. It's also likely that the insurance company will lay the blame at the door of the installer and take legal action against them to recoup their losses.
One thing is certain – it could prove a very interesting few months until the dust settles. Look at it from the view of the insurer: would you pay out where a loss was incurred that could have been saved by leaving the system alone? The answer could have come straight from the lips of the great John Wayne himself, "The hell I will".
Doing a presentation at the insurance seminars was a new experience to me. There is no going back and re-wording or re-phrasing until it sounds right ... it has to be delivered right first time. However, I was in the company of some very experienced speakers and I learned a lot from them. I would therefore like to take this opportunity to say thank you. They demonstrated discretion, knowledge and skill and I learned a lot.
I have another thank you to offer – this time to Julie Kenny and the Pyronix team. After three years of cajoling, begging and arm twisting I managed to wangle myself a ticket for their Wednesday night bash at IFSEC ... and is was a damned good do in a huge disco basement in Birmingham. There was a jazz band, a juggler, a magician and a stilt walker, not to mention a free bar for the first hour and a buffet. The place was heaving and a lot of "shop" was talked. All I can say is thanks for the highlight of my week ... and if you want to ply me with tickets for next year I am prepared to walk barefoot over broken glass singing God Save the Queen!
Source
Security Installer
Postscript
Mike Lynskey is a former proprietor and independent inspector of alarm systems. He is now a network manager with the NSI. The personal views expressed should not be taken as the opinions of the NSI. E-mail Mike on mike.lynskey@virgin.net
No comments yet