Establishing potential risks is an easy task. What is not so simple is minimising them while maintaining the type of environment that is welcoming and conducive to learning. Can we realistically achieve our objectives without creating a Fort Knox? Yes, but we must make schools aware that installing security equipment can never entirely remove the risks and that vigilance of staff will also play an important role. The other important aspect is that the protection of the school population and building may well require different types of equipment, therefore it is important to clearly establish what the school is trying to achieve. This will avoid subsequent confusion and disappointment.
As with all installations, it is vital to conduct a comprehensive risk assessment. But even with the additional money made available to them, schools have limited resources. Any assessment has to look closely at what risks need to be given priority, what course of action should be taken and how its effectiveness should be measured. With the vast differences between schools in terms of age, size and lay-out of the building and those who attend it, a formulaic risk assessment is not possible. An installer must look afresh at each school, assessing its individual strengths and weaknesses. This will also need to be regularly reviewed by the school and installer. Establishing access zones: start with the perimeter and work your way in when defining access zones to a school. Outlying areas should be enclosed using fences, walls, gates etc. Areas that are particularly vulnerable – especially those out of sight of the main school building – might be suitable for a basic CCTV system, although this will require additional manning. A decision needs to be made by the school. Are they able to handle this? And who should be responsible – janitor, secretary, receptionist? Because of the additional strain this places on resources, many schools focus on protecting the main building with access control and a door entry system instead, which require minimal staff monitoring.
DUNBLANE SHOOTINGS
The ideal situation at the main school building is to have just the one access point which makes restricting and monitoring visitors far easier. The Cullen Report into the Dunblane shootings explained how the gunman used a side door to gain access to the school and states "had he used the main entrance it was more likely that he would have been seen". This may mean reducing the number of doors or modifying them to operate as fire doors that only open out.
Woodhall Junior, Infants & Nursery School made such a decision. It had a number of doors located around the perimeter that provided access to the classrooms. It was decided to remove access to the rooms from these doors, leaving access through the two main doors, which are protected by a BPT video door entry system and a swipe card access control system.
Having limited access to the school operated and secured by electronic means could prove problematic with 'rush' hours when pupils are arriving and leaving. However during these busy periods the main entrance doors can be left opened, although it might be advisable to have a member of staff present just to keep a watchful eye. At all other times the doors should be kept shut and locked, accessible only by authorised staff using the access control system. Visitors wanting to gain access to the school should ideally be able to request it using a door entry system, which can be installed as part of the access control or set alongside it. A door entry system will allow the visitor to call the appropriate place to gain access. In larger schools this could be the janitor, main office or a specified classroom. In smaller schools, it is likely to be the classroom itself.
We have already established that most schools do not have the manpower to monitor a CCTV system and that the focus is therefore placed on access control and door entry systems. But, with a vast array of such systems available, what type will be the most suitable and affordable? Unfortunately, the most obvious consideration when it comes to equipment choice for a school environment has to be vandal resistance. Can the equipment be attacked with glue, screwdrivers, hammers and even fire, yet remain operable? No system can be 100 per cent vandal resistant, but there are certain door entry and access control systems that will last longer under a sustained attack. The important aspects to look out for are the casing (stainless steel and polycarbonate are very durable), a lack of openings where implements can be forced in, and the buttons and LEDs should all be flush mounted, preferably round so leverage is next to impossible and designed so that it is difficult to get any implements down between the button and the casing.
Keypads used in access control have been around for a long time and many are highly resistant to attack. However, they are at the bottom rung of the security level and are rapidly becoming out-dated due to relying on a predetermined code which often ends up being written down so users can remember it and it can easily be seen by someone standing nearby. Swipe card systems are by their very nature, not going to be very vandal resistant – you can insert something into the reader to prevent a card being swiped through. However they are cost effective and can still be used for schools that are not prone to vandalism, especially those for the lower age groups, and for smaller schools with low level pedestrian traffic. Insertion readers can become clogged with dirt, the reader heads can wear out and cards bend and/or break or can have their barcode or magnetic stripe damaged with extensive use. Of course, swipe cards are all very well for smaller educational establishments, but what about the large schools in our cities? Swipe cards and keypads are really not an option due to the wear and tear, and because they can be slow.
First you have to find the card, make sure it's the right way round, accurately insert it and then put the card back. When other people are trying to get in behind you, this can be a problem. Proximity access control systems are the obvious solution for premises that have a large flow of pedestrian traffic. The key components to a proximity access control system are a control unit, readers and cards or tags, each of which are encoded with an individual number.
Unlike swipe access control, the cards or tags do not have any physical contact with the reader but once valid tags are presented within the pre-specified range (5cm – 2m), their code is compared to the data in a look-up table in a database either at the reader location, a separate access control unit or at a central computer. If the code is valid for that door at that time, the electronic door release or electro magnetic lock is released, thus opening the door.
RADIO FREQUENCY ENERGY
This is achieved using radio frequency (RF) energy. The proximity reader emits a constant field of RF energy via an antenna. The tag also has an antenna which picks up the RF energy and responds by transmitting back its unique code. This system can either be passive or active (i.e. battery operated) and standalone such as BPT's Impro Multi-Scan II, or networked, although the latter pushes the cost up dramatically and is usually unnecessary in a school environment.
Instead, it might be more appropriate in larger schools to simply zone an access control system for cleaners, caretakers, the medical room, staff room, computer room, etc.
Proximity systems have no physical contact whatsoever between the tag and the reader so there can never be any wear and tear and the readers can be very small – they can even be made 'invisible' by installing them in the very fabric of the wall, without any detrimental effect to the read range. This is great news for schools that suffer from vandalism – what you can't see and can't get at can't be broken! The other advantage of a proximity access control system in a large school is that many systems allow individual tags to be suspended at any time without the need for deletion, ensuring that lost tags or tags that belong to former members of staff cannot be used to gain access.
It is important not to over-sell security to a school. It can never realistically prevent an intruder gaining access altogether, but it can make it more difficult and delay that person, giving the school valuable time to take appropriate action. A school houses our future – it is important we ensure a secure future.
Overall assessment
Source
Security Installer