Improved alarm system specification and installation standards have been promised by the European standard BS EN 50131-1 for the past five years, so what's stopping installers from making good use of its grading systems – and ridding end users of the spectre of false alarms into the bargain?
Recent publicity surrounding the contentious issue of alarm system confirmation has somewhat overshadowed a wider and more important debate – the long-running failure to introduce new European standards. Ironically, these standards offer a raft of potential benefits to end users, including the Holy Grail of a reduction in false alarms. Yet they've now been gathering dust on the shelf for five long years.

In the meantime, alarm system users have been squeezed by tighter police constraints on alarm response – most recently by way of the ACPO 'Security Systems Policy 2000'.

Over 20 years have elapsed since a 'standstill' was imposed on revisions to BS 4737, but the industry is still making use of it. Half a decade after the publication of BS EN 50131-1:1997, this superior European standard series cannot be complied with in all its system grades. In turn, this means that BS 4737 remains the key to the design of present day security alarm systems.

50131's advantages include the introduction of positive moves such as risk analysis and flexible methods of setting and unsetting the premises' alarm system. All of these moves promise to address false alarms, one of the main causes of which is entry and/or exit to/from a protected premises.

Technical hurdles for installers
So why the continuing delay experienced by end users in reaping the benefits of these improvements? Well, in theory there's nothing to hold back the installation fraternity.

To assist all those parties who want to begin specifying, installing and inspecting to the European standards, a published document – PD6662:2000 'Scheme for the Application of European Standards for Intruder Alarm Systems' – has been available for over two years. Introduced with encouragement from insurers keen to see early implementation of the European standards, its purpose was to facilitate the specification and installation of intruder alarms complying with all four grades of system listed in 50131.

However, in practice the exciting opportunities offered by 50131 have foundered on technical hurdles yet to be overcome. That said, the long journey may soon be over... with some observers forecasting a final breakthrough that could see the standard's practical implementation by installers in 2003.

In a sense, some of the gains presented by 50131 have, thus far at any rate, proven to be its undoing. The concept of security grading or 'ranking' of installation work according to the type of system involved is central to this story. Four security grades are specified: Grade 1 (low risk), Grade 2 (low-to-medium risk), Grade 3 (medium-to-high risk) and Grade 4 (very high risk). These grades consider the skill and knowledge of the potential intruder and the availability of tools.

Indeed, a matrix has been produced for members of the Association of British Insurers suggesting which grade of system should be considered when looking to determine the risk categories for particular areas being protected. For commercial premises the key Grades 3 and 4 have so far required movement detectors with the ability to detect masking and offering significant reductions in range.

This controversial requirement, though, has proven something of an obstacle in publishing a central plank of the 50131 series – namely a standard for detectors. Without this, alarm installers are limited to working on systems in Grades 1 and 2, which effectively restricts them to residential buildings and a limited range of commercial premises.

50131 is so much more up-to-date than BS 4737. It has a better structure, and introduces the concept of designing alarm systems in accordance with a building’s specific risks – looking at important factors such as what is likely to be stolen, and the haza

The logjam has been caused by the lack of equipment available to meet this requirement for movement detectors to detect significant reductions in range. "Anti-masking detectors have not been used in any significant number because of the cost implications, while generally speaking insurers don't specify them," states Mike Cahalane, principal consultant at Mica Associates.

Range reduction detection
Geoff Tate – chief executive of the Security Systems and Alarms Inspection Board (SSAIB) – adds that, thus far, the requirement has been too advanced for the available technology. With this in mind, a proposal has recently been put before European Standards Committee members to apply range reduction detection to the [highest risk] Grade 4 systems only. Grade 4 is the bank or military level of alarm system. If you like, the equivalent of BS 7042 in the UK.

As the convenor of CENELEC TC79 Working Group 1, Geoff Tate is in a better position than most to divulge news of any breakthrough. While not proving to be a very popular one, Tate believes this Grade 4 move would at least enable an important technical standard to be produced for PIRs, followed by a similar one covering dual technology detectors. In turn, this would pave the way for practical implementation of the European standards. To coin a phrase, the alarms 'dam' would at last be well and truly burst.

"We're quite keen to move this along as quickly as possible, and as a result we're preparing to organise some one day appreciation courses on the European standards specifically for SSAIB firms," adds Tate, "followed by comprehensive training courses for those SSAIB companies wishing to move to the new standards."

Tate continues: "50131 is so much more up-to-date than BS 4737. It has a better structure, and introduces the concept of designing alarm systems in accordance with a building's specific risks – looking at important factors such as what is likely to be stolen, the hazards presented by the building's location, the type of materials used in its construction and the various access points."

Risk analysis: the way forward?
Martyn Halliday – risk manager in the security division at insurer Norwich Union – is also excited by the concept of risk analysis. "To me, that is a very positive way forward because the installer would have to consider the surroundings and the risk being protected," suggests Halliday.

Currently, this aspect of alarm system installation is very much a secondary consideration to the technical aspects of a system's design and installation under Part 4 of BS 4737. For their part, insurers want to be able to specify the grade of intruder alarm system that will protect a particular risk. This becomes a practicality when the industry adopts 50131.

At the National Security Inspectorate (NSI), an optional pilot scheme allowing installers to use 50131 in accordance with PD6662 has been available for some time now. Technical manager Anthony Weeks reports that this particular NSI initiative hasn't really taken off to date – although some 50 installers have registered – because of the requirement in security Grades 3 and 4 to detect significant reductions in range, not to mention the lack of available and compliant detector equipment. Insurers do wish to promote 50131, but they'll not – in the eyes of Weeks – be pushing the case too hard until the issue has been resolved.

"The importance of resolving the issue is underlined by the large proportion of risks falling into the Grade 3 category," suggests Weeks. "The European standards will make life easier for insurers because they can then grade each premises' risk. However, initially it will make life harder for installers who'll be required to establish the risk involved, and make an associated judgement about the risk category into which each individual premises would fall."

In addition, there are bound to be borderline cases at 'break points' between system grades which can only emphasise the difficulty in making these judgements. As there haven't been any grade breaks within the long-established BS 4737, it will be a new discipline that end users' installers must handle.

Plus-points for the end user
Weeks is upbeat about the gains end users can expect from 50131. On the technical front, for example, improved alarm system specification and installation standards must be perceived as nothing other than a positive step. The full cost implications aren't yet known, and it remains to be seen if these turn out to be significant. Advantages are also forthcoming in terms of the flexibility offered by remote setting/unsetting of a building's alarm system.

A major installer has already investigated external setting/unsetting in a trial designed to look towards future 'central locking' of buildings. Conducted in conjunction with a number of major insurers, it demonstrated how this can be done with a remote keyfob device.

For commercial premises the key Grades 3 and 4 have so far required movement detectors with the ability to detect masking and offering significant reductions in range.
This controversial requirement, though, has proven something of an obstacle in pu

Martyn Halliday has publicly voiced his frustration that recent publicity over alarm confirmation has clouded the greater gains offered by the facilities in 50131. "To me, the whole ACPO Security Systems Policy issue is only to do with false alarm calls," states Halliday. "The industry is always turning to us and saying 'It's the users' and 'Lack of training' that's to blame for systems sprouting false alarms. This European standard presents a new playing field, and an opportunity to apply a more imaginative approach to these issues."

Exactly how might that work in practice? Halliday adds: "We can begin to design the systems around the operators, instead of blaming them for not using them properly. The introduction of DD243:2002, with its choice of setting and unsetting, is indeed taking installers some way towards the 50131 philosophy. They should now be considering the best method of setting and unsetting a given system, taking into account all the features of the risk."

Meantime, 50131 also offers an opportunity for remote systems maintenance of Grade 2 and 3 systems by the installer. PD6662 makes it a requirement for a minimum of two visits per year, but one of these may well be electronic by way of up and downloading.

Geoff Tate points out that the European standard provides a much broader functionality than the previously used upload/download procedures. "Besides which," adds Tate, "end users will benefit from the broad rule of thumb that the less an alarm system is disturbed the more likely it is to continue functioning properly."

Adopting the German example
Turning to the wider issue of false alarms reduction, Tate stresses that if the spirit of 50131 is realised it should prove valuable.

However, the standard doesn't state how this reduction in false alarms is to be achieved. It therefore remains to be seen whether or not this will actually happen in practice. The standard merely opines that the system design should minimise false alarms, without saying how it might take place in the real world. By contrast, of course, the UK standard is a far more specific, solutions-based document.

Insurance advisor Graeme Dow states that, in many ways, the regulatory DD243:2002 document – ie BS DD243:2002 'Code of Practice for Confirmed Alarm Systems' – which is used in connection with the ACPO policy is something of "a halfway house" towards 50131. It includes relevant parts of the 50131 standard series, and offers new setting/unsetting provisions. One method that could be employed is to have door locks connected to the alarm mechanism. This has direct parallels with the German 'Blockschloss' method whereby access to a premises is only enabled once the alarm system has been deactivated.

The 'Blockschloss' method was included in research undertaken last year by the British Security Industry Association into methods used by other European countries to reduce the number of false calls generated by intruder alarm systems. It effectively eliminates user error as a cause of false alarms but, because it demands special installation techniques to avoid false activations in window and door sensors, it's also relatively expensive.

A complex and fluid situation
All things considered, then, the situation for end users of intruder alarm systems remains both complex and fluid. At long last, though, there is now real hope on the horizon with the likely publication of technical specifications for detectors. Security Management Today understands that a recent vote held by the CENELEC TC79 Committee narrowly failed to pass a standard for PIR detectors. To overcome this problem, a proposal has been made to publish the PIR document as a technical specification rather than a European standard.

As such, the standard can be published without any further delay, but with the drawback that its introduction across Europe would be on a voluntary basis. While this would undoubtedly undermine the principle of a 'European standard', it does allow those countries wishing to use the standard to introduce a national standard. In the UK it would be a 'British Standard'. This would then free-up the log-jammed implementation of the entire BS EN 50131 standard series.

The practical effect is profound – namely to unleash up-to-date methodology in pursuit of on-the-ground advantages for end users, their alarm system installers, insurers, the police service and indeed the public at large. With the level of false alarm calls continuing to prompt concern, the move can only prove beneficial.