The UK’s rail regulator Tom Winsor has already suggested that it would be “completely impractical and unaffordable” to introduce airport-style security to the rail network, but that doesn’t sit comfortably with British Transport Police figures for 2004 which suggest a 14% rise in violent crimes on the railways. What can be done to ameliorate the situation? Mike Goldsmith casts an experienced eye over the problem.
Improving security on Britain’s rail network has perhaps never been a more pressing issue. The ongoing threat of terrorist attack on the UK mainland is compelling many rail operators to review their security strategies and procedures – not least because last year’s atrocities in Madrid are still fresh in the mind, for passengers and rail administrators alike.
The attacks in Madrid were extremely sophisticated, with the near simultaneous detonation of ten explosive charges killing just under 200 innocent people. That wasn’t an isolated incident, either. It’s estimated that 181 terrorist attacks on trains and related targets took place between 1998 and 2003, resulting in over 430 deaths in countries as diverse as Venezuela, India and Columbia (these estimates having been taken from the RAND-MIPT Terrorist Incident Database).
Any form of public transport – but particularly the railways – is an obvious target for the would-be terrorist. Only recently, MI5 supremo Eliza Manningham-Buller warned that air and rail transport networks in the UK could be attacked by Al-Qaeda. British rail regulator Tom Winsor has also spoken of the vulnerabilities inherent in our rail system (see ‘Platform for improvement’, pp18-21).
Railway crime is on the rise
The terrorist threat is combined with increasing levels of crime on the railways. In 2004, the British Transport Police (BTP) – which employs more than 2,000 officers to cover no less than 10,000 miles of track and 3,000 stations – reported a 14% rise in violent crime on the railways. Meantime, research conducted by Group 4 Securicor (UK Security) has found that one in every five UK adult residents is now more afraid to travel by rail or London Underground than was the case a mere 12 months ago, mainly due to concerns over personal safety.
The survey was conducted by TNS among a representative sample of 1,095 adults in Great Britain aged between 16 and 64 between 17 and 19 August 2004. Such figures are replicated across the global rail community.
For a rail operator, providing a safe, secure environment for passengers is also concerned with protecting revenues. After all, if any potential or existing rail users perceive their personal safety to be in question, they’ll steer clear of using the rail network. A first step is to assess the scope of the threat. This process may begin with an analysis of potential targets, and risks to (and the gaps in) current security provision – such as poorly lit areas in and around stations, hot spots for CCTV cameras or the presence of physical security barriers.
For example, in the UK an analysis of the IRA bombing campaigns on the mainland led to the implementation of simple yet effective measures, such as improvements to perimeter fencing, the installation of CCTV and encouraging staff and passengers to report any suspicious behaviour or packages. At present, some American operators are experimenting with chemical and biological agent detection systems. Indeed, it’s common knowledge that managers of the subway system in Washington have now introduced a method for identifying suspect packages.
You do not have passenger counts akin to those carried out by the airlines. The idea of establishing security checks at every railway station, complete with X-ray equipment and
so on, would be so enormous as to be really unaffordable
Need for human intervention
Technology has a vital role to play in railway security. In recent years, many station managers have invested heavily in CCTV systems in a bid to discourage criminal activity, and help in identifying offenders. It’s possible that airport-style security checks involving baggage scanning and metal detectors may be introduced. At present, however, Eurostar is the only service in Europe where passengers and their baggage are screened.
That said, security is every bit as much a human issue as it is one focusing on technology. Human intervention and judgement is absolutely crucial in providing a level of experience, intelligence and intuition that technology alone simply cannot deliver. Physical security in the shape of uniformed private sector security officers provides a reassuring presence and a visible deterrent.
There’s also a great demand for such officers: 74% of adults claim they would feel safer when travelling by rail if there was a visible presence of uniformed security officers on the train or on the platforms.
For an operator, developing more comprehensive security regimes will often encompass greater direct revenue protection. In the UK, it’s estimated that rail operators lose 290 million Euros in revenue every year because of individuals who travel without a ticket. Central Trains recently stated that as many as 6% of its Midlands rail passengers travelled without a valid ticket in the past 12 months. The cost in penalty fares for these journeys could equate to at least £130 million.
Those UK rail operators who’ve employed a security strategy combining physical and technological security measures have reaped the benefits. In Group 4 Securicor’s experience, rail operators immediately see a return of as much as three times the level of original investment through the collection of fares previously left unpaid.
The Rail Passengers Council is calling for extra revenue raised by bigger fines to be spent on an increased number of ticket inspectors aboard trains and “automatic ticket barriers that make it impossible to dodge payment of fares”. Revenue protection officers in conjunction with automated ticketing barriers (which can be watched over by CCTV officers and a dedicated CCTV system during anti-social hours) will encourage even slippery passengers to buy a ticket prior to boarding.
Buying men in uniforms or CCTV systems at the lowest possible cost is a far cry from investing due time and resources in a security strategy aimed at protecting assets, employees and customers, while maintaining the integrity of a brand
However, the BTP report issued in 2004 revealed that investment in security is still sparse among the UK’s rail operators. Similarly, the Confederation of British Industry recently published some of its own research work in which it’s suggested that less than 20% of businesses expect to increase their spend on security over the next five years.
A lack of ownership
Too often, security is seen as a cost to business rather than as an investment in the continuity of operations and safety of the company and its customers. Buying men in uniforms or CCTV systems at the lowest possible cost is a far cry from investing due time and resources in a security strategy aimed at protecting assets, employees and customers, while at the same time maintaining the integrity of a brand. In this case the UK’s rail network.
Immediately following the Madrid bombings, Bob Crow – general secretary of the Rail, Maritime and Transport Union (RMT) – said: “We are concerned that the [rail operating] companies should undertake an urgent review of existing security measures, and ensure they employ directly recruited and vetted staff.” That statement is as true now as it was then.
A persistent problem is the lack of senior management ownership of the security strategy. The rail industry isn’t alone in this.
Across every sector, it seems, there’s still much talk about corporate security but minimal action to back up people’s words. Litter bins – perfect receptacles for explosive devices – may have been taken away from our stations, but while the buying of security remains the domain of the facilities management function, sadly that scenario is unlikely to change.
Source
SMT
Postscript
Mike Goldsmith is director of the aviation, rail and maritime division at Group 4 Securicor (UK Security)
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