Playing it by the rules

Whenever a major conference is staged to deal with a topic which has hitherto been on the fringes of a given industry’s radar, it’s a sure sign that subject has moved swiftly up the agenda. Take security for sporting arenas...

Last October, the International Sports Security Summit made its debut at the QEII Conference Centre in Westminster. Developing effective security strategies, co-ordinating multiple agencies, the role of accreditation, out-of-stadium and in-stadium security, the role of technology and lessons learned from the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens – all were very firmly fixed on the discussion agenda.

This month, London once again hosts an inaugural gathering. The ‘Public Venue, Sport and Live Entertainment Security’ Conference takes place at the same venue (see panel ‘Public Venue, Sport and Live Entertainment Security’: 18-19 April – QEII Conference Centre, London’). Major events will be examined from the perspective of the police. There’ll be discussion sessions aimed at understanding the true nature of the threat from terrorism, and tips for in-house and contract security managers in working with intelligence and profiling people (in order to manage crowds and, therefore, implement successful security strategies).

Then, of course, we have London’s bid to host the Olympic Games in 2012. As the Bid Team waits with fingers crossed to see if we have succeeded in ‘bagging’ what is arguably sport’s richest prize (see panel ‘Group 4 Securicor supports bid for 2012 Games’), its members are clearly determined to show the international sporting community that security and safety at our major venues is built into the planning right from the start.

Last October, London 2012 chairman Barbara Cassani and chief executive Keith Mills travelled to Switzerland for briefings with the International Olympic Committee (IOC). Security, they reported back, is very much at the top of the Committee’s agenda.

Did the Athens experience teach us anything about security at sporting events in the UK? There are many tips that London 2012 (and security managers in general) might absorb.

Last summer’s Games, which successfully ran from 13-29 August, played host to an unprecedented security operation. Even the heightened security measures put in place for the 1976 Montreal Olympics following the murder of 11 Israeli athletes at the Munich Games in 1972 came nowhere near the demands placed on an international event involving over 200 different nations in a post-9/11 world.

The full plan came into effect on 1 July 2004, with a special focus on the Athens region.

Life wasn’t made any easier for the Greek hosts with an unexpected change of Government only four months before the Opening Ceremony. Then there was scaremongering in the media that the stadiums wouldn’t be ready on time. Last April, The Times even sent out a structural engineer – Norman Train – to assess the likelihood of all the venues being ready on time, as well as safe and secure.

At the time, Train warned that corners were likely to be cut, and that there would be less time than was needed to erect security fencing and perimeter detection, install access control systems and CCTV and adequately train security officers. As a result, there were claims made by the BBC that the British Olympic Association was having cold feet about sending athletes to the Games at all.

Although a flurry of reports of this nature were subsequently proven to be untrue, several bomb threats in central Athens moved the Greek Government towards a very public response. In early June, public order minister Giorgos Voulgarakis chaperoned a team of officials on a four-day tour of all the proposed Olympic venues and key border areas to vet the security arrangements in person.

Prior to this, UK officials had been administering security-related training to Greek officials as preparation for the Games. Much of that training was co-ordinated through the International Olympic Advisory Group of ‘concerned’ countries (which listed ourselves, the US, Australia, France, Germany, Israel and Spain among its ranks). Some training was specifically requested by Greek officials.

However, none of this activity was sufficient to prevent the IOC from insuring against partial or full cancellation of the Games in a massive £93 million policy agreement covering Acts of God and terrorism.

On the day before the Olympic torch made its final journey to the stadium from Cyprus, the Greek Government informed the IOC that all senior personnel – including heads of state – would be protected by Greek armed police, with no private security teams in view. Subsequently, the American, British and Israeli athletes were afforded 24-hour armed guards (as they were viewed as the most likely targets for would-be terrorists). All athlete conveyance vehicles carried an armed guard on board, while police helicopters and even armoured vehicles were on constant standby.

There’s little doubt that US support for the entire security operation was most welcome. Its involvement in security planning and practice exercises through the Olympic Advisory Group was extremely beneficial, with American satellites used during the Games to collect information on local security. That information was subsequently channelled to the Greek authorities. There was also at least one secret briefing conducted by the US ambassador to Greece – Thomas Miller – with those in charge of security at the US Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation.

Nuclear security action plans

The Greeks certainly brought in the Big Guns to help them. Two months prior to the Games, newly-elected Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis held talks with NATO secretary general Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, later announcing that anyone violating Greek airspace during the Games was likely to be shot down by NATO aeroplanes directed by AWACS.

In addition – and for the first time – the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) participated in an unprecedented joint action plan to ensure a high level of nuclear security at the 2004 Games. Armed with a $500,000 donation from the US, the Authority set up a series of radiation detectors to pinpoint any illicit trafficking or malicious use of radioactive materials.

Radiation detectors – both portable and fixed – were installed at border crossings to stave off any attempted ‘dirty bomb’ attacks.

The nuclear security plan encompassed 22 separate clinics, 16 hospitals, six Greek cities, one industrial area and a research plant. Six major border sites were equipped with portable monitoring systems, while a further 27 border sites, along with airports and sea ports, were protected by hand-held instruments. Radiation monitoring was also in place at several of the Olympic venues in the form of detection equipment supplied by the Greek Atomic Energy Commission.

Interpol’s general secretary Ronald K Noble also visited Athens to co-ordinate with the Greek police authorities, and to review the security arrangements.

As far back as January 2002, Noble was discussing security issues with Athens 2004 president Gianna Angelopoulos-Daskalaki. The European Union’s police agency – Europol – was also involved.

Risk management in focus

As for the private security sector, it helped stage one of the earliest international co-operative ventures on Olympic security – Exposec 2002 – which was held at Greece’s Helexpo Exhibition Centre.

The Exposec panel of experts included Neil Fergus, security manager for the 2000 Games in Sydney and Vic Subia from the Science Applications International Corporation (subsequently appointed as one of the main contractors for the Athens Games). At the time, Fergus was keen to stress the importance of risk management. “The action plan should cover all competition and non-competition venues, as well as the entire city of Athens.”

The plan that eventually materialised was nothing if not the result of a gigantic volume of work. The task was mammoth. Over 10,500 athletes were present at the Games, not to mention their official escorts. Then there was a further 8,000 members of the Olympic ‘family’ to consider (people who look after the athletes during their stay and provide support to the Athletes’ Village). On top of all this there were 6,700 judges and referees in attendance, 5,800 formal guests, 21,600 journalists (more than two to every one athlete!) and the small matter of two million visitors. A tour de force.

Overall responsibility for security at the Athens Games fell at the feet of the Hellenic Police, who reside under the ‘umbrella’ of the Ministry of Public Order. A special police unit – entitled the Olympic Games Security Division – was set up for the Games, reporting directly to the Chief of Police. It was staffed by the police service itself, the national Coast Guard, the fire brigade and the usual defence forces.

A special run-through exercise was conducted in November 2002. Codenamed ‘Rainbow’, the exercise entailed no fewer than 1,800 personnel becoming involved in a number of security scenarios, including a mock passenger jet hijacking and bomb threats against a cruise ship. At all times, there was close co-operation with officials from the UK’s very own Home Office.

Venue security management was provided by 50 senior officers hailing from the Hellenic Police, Port Patrol and the fire service. All had to complete some basic, additional training to do with the Olympic venue in question, and then concentrated on operational planning duties in the weeks leading up to the Games.

The Olympic Village: a security heart

The Olympic Village acted as the nub of the Games’ security operation. High level security was in force throughout. An independent Olympic Village Security Command Centre was built, and equipped with state-of-the-art security systems. Concrete barriers surrounded the village, which was also protected by dedicated arrays of CCTV cameras and X-ray machines.

General measures to protect the athletes and VIPs included policing the Olympic road network, tight security at all of the venues with diligent monitoring and the essential capacity to be able to respond speedily to any incident. Special measures included close protection regimes, site inspections, advance escorts, airspace protection and so on. All traffic management was carried out from a special Traffic Monitoring and Control Operations Room in line with prior planning. Other than an invasion from outer space, seemingly every other possible contingency was covered.

The Games’ organisers also made effective use of independent consultants. Security advisor Peter Ryan, a British security expert who worked at the 2000 Sydney Games, held lengthy meetings with all of the relevant authorities, most notably the Greek police.

International companies also helped with the security equipment that had a vital part to play in Athens. US firm Science Applications International Corporation purchased software from the Cambridge-based UK company Autonomy for its contract to supply security support to the Games. The Autonomy software – designated Intelligent Data Operating Layer – makes it easier to monitor potentially suspicious activity. It can also throw up links in real time between documents that, on the face of it, have no association.

The security forces in Athens made use of German remote-controlled bomb disposal robots to deal with the kind of devices planted in Athens city centre in the April prior to the Games beginning. Lasco International Group, meanwhile, provided armoured vehicles and professionally-trained drivers.

All eyes on London 2012

Should it be successful in its attempt to capture the 2012 Games for the UK, the central lesson to be learned by the London 2012 Bid Team – and the police and security forces alike – is that the Greek authorities treated the whole of their country as an Olympic Games facility. Security was tight everywhere.

In spite of long term fears over completion dates of the main venues, the Greeks managed to host what many people believe to have been one of the best Olympic competitions of all time. It was also one of the most secure Games the world has witnessed.

A fact that should not be lost on London 2012’s representatives.