Screening must not be diluted in any way

SIR – I write with reference to The Security Watchdog managing director Terry O’Neil’s recent Opinion article in Security Management Today (‘Raising the bar beyond BS 7858’, SMT, December 2004, p11), Securiplan chief executive Phillip Ullmann’s Guarding Watch column (‘Keep screening in Securi-Check’, SMT, February 2005, p46) and the lead News Update item in the same edition (‘Securi-Check launched: an alternative solution to BS 7858’, p7).

Whether any of us like it or not, the world has changed. Events such as 9/11, the Barings Bank scenario, Enron, increasing problems with money laundering and identity theft have increased the threat to society which, in turn, has made individuals and companies examine their own business processes and how they might improve upon them.

Why, then, do Terry O’Neil and Phillip Ullmann wish to dilute security screening to a lesser standard?

The platform for change was the British Standards Institution’s GW/3 and GW/4 Committee for the revision of BS 7858:1996. As a co-opted member, I – like Terry – served on this Committee alongside representatives from other notable security industry bodies. The industry was consulted about the revised draft of BS 7858 back in 2003. I attended every one of those meetings, but I do not recall the Committee having received any comments from Securiplan.

As far as I’m concerned, for Terry to state that Securi-Check is “raising the bar beyond BS 7858” could not be further from the truth. Obtaining “quality employment references covering the past three years”, which is what Phillip is advocating, is a lesser standard of checking. A “criminality check, both for the UK and abroad” does not mean the individual is fit for the available position. Due to reputational risk, many employers choose not to prosecute an individual who would otherwise be prosecuted. That’s a matter of fact.

Given the increase in the number of individuals arriving from overseas nations where criminality checks may not be recorded accurately, if indeed they are recorded at all, the value of these checks is – at best – questionable. The ‘right to work in the UK’ is already covered by the change to Section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration Act 1996, itself implemented on 1 May 2004.

Do not let us forget that, in this vast security industry of ours, the guarding sector is but one that uses BS 7858. Should we allow an alarm engineer into our homes if they’ve been ‘checked’ under a lesser standard (even though their details may have been run through the Police National Computer)? Should we allow companies who destroy confidential documents to work under a lesser standard?

The answer to both questions is a resounding ‘No!’.

Might I suggest that the furore caused by the introduction of Securi-Check has rather less to do with improvements in security and more to do with saving money on the bottom line to counter the increased cost realised by Security Industry Authority licensing?