Terrorism: the new dimension

Few of us are ever likely to forget the drama that unfolded during the morning of Tuesday 11 September 2001 in New York, Washington DC and close to Pittsburgh. Images of innocent workers jumping through shattered windows – for whatever reason – graphically illustrated the despair of those trapped inside the stricken North and South Towers of the World Trade Centre.

Speaking purely from a military point of view, the aircraft attacks undoubtedly represented a well-planned and well-executed operation, apparently achieving two of the terrorists' three objectives – namely attacking the political, economic and military power base of the United States.

There were three important dimensions to the attack. First, today's groups of fundamentalist Muslims appear to be more militant and are, quite obviously, prepared to 'die for the cause'. The second aspect is the discriminatory ignorance of the presence of civilians in the attack as opposed to a 'shield' or bargaining counter. The third is the direct attack on US soil.

As security practitioners, what can we here in the UK learn from the tragic events of 11 September?

I believe that two fundamental principles of security remain valid – 'defence in depth by working from the inside out' and 'security is not as expensive as insecurity'.

Aviation security in context
Given the definite threat of terrorism, one would have thought that the US risk would have been minimised by an increase in internal security. Particularly with respect to aviation security which, historically, has usually realised the best results for the terrorist. It seems that would have gone against the grain.

In Europe we are familiar with more stringent aviation security, even on internal flights. With the exception of a few airports, airline travel can be considered a safe bet in security terms. In the US, there were no real or imagined barriers, no deterrent barriers to dissuade the terrorists. It seems that recommendations to improve aviation security were rejected, probably for commercial reasons – which brings me to my second principle, namely that 'security is not as expensive as insecurity'.

No-one denies that security can be expensive, but once those litigation lawyers start weaving their magic wand, as they surely will, then some organisations are going to be paying out far more in terms of financial settlements, insurance claims and damage to reputation than it would have cost for introducing protective security. Where is PanAm after Lockerbie?

The attack on America is a wake-up call for us all. For a decade, Governments and institutions alike have interfered with nationalism, ignored public concerns about the effect of capitalism on poorer countries and the environment and have punished the innocent.

Whereas terrorist groups are usually singularly-focused, heads of Government are accountable to their electorates. Thus a co-ordinated international response is difficult. In any event, Governments and institutions must first clear out their own back yards.

The new face of terrorism
Certainly, this latest attack is proof-positive that terrorism has now taken on new dimensions. National borders will have to be protected, and the terrorists corralled.

In the UK, identity cards are a must. Also, our Government must come to terms with the fact that it may have to undertake military action to undermine the threat posed by terrorist organisations.

Modern extradition procedures must be developed, and terrorist finances attacked – if necessary by covert means. Commercial and public organisations alike will need to be far more effective with their protective security.

Most importantly of all, perhaps, Governments and corporations must listen to – and then act upon – the grievances of the dispossessed. It is they who are the casualties of globalisation. I believe that the key to defeating terrorism is not the deployment of Special Forces, but the eradication of the political causes of terrorism.

However, any actions taken have to be balanced with sensible personal liberties and not a strict adherence to human rights at whatever cost to the victim.

As security professionals, we must build a greater understanding of the nature of terrorism. A knowledge of the law is far less useful than that of the relationship between terrorism, espionage, sabotage and subversion.

Ultimately, the vast wealth of practical and theoretical intelligence and security experience among us needs to be exploited by Governments, institutions and corporations alike. That must be our contribution to combating terrorism, both on the national and international stages.