Every country has its own industry set ups and individual ways of dealing with the headache … and they're as different as lasagne and sauerkraut.
But can UK installers (and the industry as a whole) learn anything from their continental peers?
A BSIA seminar, "The European Solution", was a methodical look at how other countries deal with false alarms and whether or not lessons can be learned. It also gave a chance for delegates from all sectors of the industry – installers, managers, manufacturers, insurers, the police – the chance to give their views on why the rate is so high and suggest ways to reduce it.
The seminar followed a study carried out by the British Security Industry Association with the aim of helping UK companies adopt the best practices.
It was acknowledged that there had been a significant reduction in false calls passed to police despite an increase in the number of systems installed (see Fig 1) … and (as all installers who haven't been on a year long project in Outer Mongolia will know) from October 1st all new monitored systems will have to include confirmation technology.
In its summary of findings the BSIA says: "There's no doubt that confirmation techniques are the way forward to reduce false calls passed to police and these techniques are being adopted throughout Europe. However these techniques only have a very small effect on user errors … the key to reducing false calls appears to be to target the user of a system." (See Fig 2)
Users were familiar with programming TV, video and hi-fi so the industry needed to come up with systems that took these habits into account.
Suggested improvements based on the findings included: easier-to-operate panels with simple menu-guided instructions (physical keys instead of keypads were preferred for setting and unsetting); closer liaison with the fire industry where alarms were largely "passive" with little direct interaction with the user and; using biometrics and pre-programmed access cards for setting/unsetting rather than digit code.
Delegates were given a free reign when it came to suggestions for improvements and told to assume the industry was not burdened with a large number of standards, codes of practice and the requirements of police, the insurance industry and the inspectorates. Here are their views:
Easy to use panels:
There was full agreement that easy to use and understand control panels was the most effective way of reducing user error and the design of panels needed to be reassessed. A manufacturer said they were guilty of "adapting technology beyond the grasp of the average user". There should be "one single action" the user had to take. Panels should not be designed by "boffins".
An installer said keypads with "thousands of functions" were not necessary, designs should be standardised.
Panels needed to provide easy to use means of set/unset/partial set with simple menu-guided instructions using the same common procedures as a bank machine or cell phone. A user said: "We crave simplicity, especially for domestic panels ... Why not use symbols?"
User tests showed that physical keys rather than keypads were preferred for setting/unsetting.
Consideration should be given to setting/unsetting from the ARC (common in Switzerland).
A manufacturer said the Italian principle of simple keyfob setting of panels would be easiest and mean fewer false alarms but "rules and regulations need to be written to allow it to happen". (Current BS 4737 does not permit it but the new Euro Norm is more flexible).
Keypads should be sited at an angle like ATMs rather than upright. "People are more comfortable pressing down not across", said one delegate. He thought some panels made too loud a noise on entry, sometimes causing user panic.
Installers were often forced to cut costs which stopped manufacturers from providing panels with features requested by the industry. Installers also needed to spend more time training users.
Biometric technology was more reliable in setting/unsetting but was not economical … "not down at our level yet", said one manufacturer.
Easy to read manuals:
Users rarely read manuals and equipment needed to be designed to operate without them. Said one manufacturer: "No matter how simple, people won't use it. Half never read the manuals so equipment has got to be easy to operate."
There should be more user/ARC interface, as in Italy. Said one ARC delegate: "Most false alarms that we filter originate from the user not operating the panel correctly. Panels do need looking at."
Systems laboratory tested:
Lab tested systems (similar to the VdS scheme in Germany) would not be feasible in the UK because it was felt it would still be possible to install a lab-tested system badly.
But third party testing of individual products was considered essential.
Installers, "driven by economics", were looking for a test mark on products. Said one manufacturer: "Installers often do not realise the difference in technology so third party certification can be helpful to raise standards".
More user-ARC interface:
Installers would like to see this facility (a keypad or other device close to the entry/exit) provided it was cost effective. One such product, The "Seedbox", providing instant comms with the ARC, was currently on the market. Some panels did have two way communication with ARCS and operators could correct user mistakes. In large ARCs, however, operators did not always have time to answer individual questions.
Users felt that some ARC operators did not have enough knowledge of control panels to talk to the user. As a result, the ARC will call the installer for advice.
Confirmation:
One installer said he had tried and not been impress-ed with audio or video confirmation systems.
The UK should consider the French system where local installers work closely with a local ARC which could be just a "little office" or even "the kitchen table". This local system also works well in Ireland because they "know the local community", said one manufacturer.
User error was the root cause of failure of existing confirmation systems. User training must improve and it was essential that installers were properly trained in confirmation systems.
Company staff training:
Installers said they wanted to be given consistent advice by manufacturers. One installer expressed the old argument that if too much effort was spent on staff training other companies would try to poach their trainees. It was countered that if all companies trained their staff there would be a movement of trained staff among companies.
An insurer said that installers should spend more time training users: "The duress facility is always wanted but a number of clients have never been shown what to do and are not aware they've got one … even high risk systems. Surely installers should show users?"
But installers said there was a lack of enthusiasm among users to be trained. Users only wanted to know what to do when problems occurred. Said one delegate "The user always signs the tickbox, saying he knows the system, but the user doesn't want the training".
More time before detectors trigger:
A manufacturer said that Euralarm, the European association of security and fire trade associations, was researching into extending the reaction time of detectors. (In the security industry the time before a detector triggers is small whereas in the fire industry the time is greater and there are fewer false alarms). "If intruder detectors had long enough to look at the analysis, they could decide whether it's false or not".
An installer said it would be helpful to know when a detector was nearing the end of its useful life so it could be replaced before problems occurred.
A manufacturer said the technology was available but manufacturers were guilty of not telling installers what could be made available because installers would not be prepared to pay the extra cost. (Delegates heard that in Belgium detectors were "as cut price as they are here").
Another manufacturer said that if insurers insisted on good quality systems, false alarms would reduce.
Electronic keys:
There was general agreement that use of electronic keys to set/unset the system would reduce user errors, but there were some reservations, particularly "Does the electronic key recognise the individual holder?"
A user was concerned that a lost key could be used by an intruder to unset a system but a manufacturer said the technology was available to disable the key if the user lost it.
Manufacturers said it was possible to programme the keys with personal user codes.
Blockschloss 'blocked lock':
(Originally used in Germany, blockschloss was the mechanical/electrical lock fitted to the final exit door. When the user unlocked the door the alarm system was switched off. When locking and leaving, the system was set, providing no detectors were in an alarm state. The mechanical lock is rarely used now but the principle works in electronic form.)
Police do not object to the 'blockschloss' principle but said it would probably be restricted on cost grounds. Many users had caused false alarms because they had not secured doors and windows. It was pointed out that it was not possible to physically lock the final door if any contacted door or window was not secured.
Delegates heard it was suitable for premises such as church halls or schools where one action opens and locks doors.
One local authority delegate said they did not want tenants to have authority on setting and insisted that locks on the doors set and unset the system. Manufacturers said it was more suited to multiple occupancy buildings. An example was given of an elderly cleaner who could not operate the panel and so it had to be replaced with a keyswitch.
Private response:
The police said they would not wish to see police response passed to the private security industry. They were working with private security companies in radio linked schemes and this had large market potential. If the industry did get involved in traditional police areas then training had to rise "dramatically".
Belgian installation companies pay up to £16,000 in advance ... as a reserve for possible future fines
Another police delegate said more alarms were being linked to mobile phones and he questioned who would respond to calls from such systems.
A user said that at one university the police responded only to high security premises. University staff attended lower risk premises but had to be given proper response driver training to prevent accidents.
An installer said that during West Midlands controversial response policy last year "quite a few" customers turned to first response services.
Fines:
In Switzerland, users pay heavy fines for false calls. As a result, manufacturers and installers have spent a lot of money guaranteeing zero false calls. "A company (installer) guarantees no false alarms. If there are, they'll pay the fines".
An installer was against the idea of fines, preferring regulation to ensure companies trained staff. If fines were introduced the industry would first have to get rid of unqualified smaller installers who did not operate to any standards. Another delegate said if a user consistently made mistakes they should be forced into training.
Another installer said Fire Brigades imposed fines on users, who accepted this penalty: "It would not be a quantum leap to introduce some form of fine because customers often assume there are fines". It was also suggested that if a user was fined it would discourage them from using "cowboy" installers.
The BSIA has identified three of the initiatives in the above discussions as crucial for cutting false alarms:
- 1. Easier to use and understand panels including electronic keys and "Blockschloss" to set /unset the system;
2. More confirmation technology, with sequential seen as the most effective;
3. More, and ongoing, training, ie manufacturers training installers and, in turn, installers training users.
The following is an overview of how other European countries tackle the problem.
System are now more reliable and there are "few false calls of a technical nature". But more than 90 per cent of calls to ARCs are false, most caused by user error during setting/unsetting. It could be argued that this is due to the complexity of control panels and installations.
In the last few years there has been a move towards audio verification. But there is a big difference in ARCs. While there are 70 in the UK there are 200 in France, many covering small areas. Each ARC has fewer premises to monitor and ARC operators can build closer relationships with users. The operator is able to discuss the cause of the false alarm and often advise on the problem.
The user buys a complete service by monthly subscription covering installation, maintenance, surveillance and intervention.
The alarm company provides first response. Police do not become involved until the alarm company has found out the cause of the alarm.
Because there is a close relationship between the alarm company, ARC and user, the user takes ownership of the system and has a willingness to consider improving it "... whereas the attitude of most users in the UK to a false call is to say to the installer: 'Your system is giving us problems'".
Some self installed systems sold through DIY stores are now fitted with remote signalling. The user fits the system then logs on to the ARC to receive monitoring. False calls on these systems are quite low "as users have taken special care".
Importantly, if the police did attend a false alarm the user faces a 3000 FRF fine (about £300).
In 1990 the government drew up a law to limit false calls. As a result, poorly designed systems have almost disappeared and the number of authorised installers has dropped from 1200 in 1990 to fewer than 700 today.
The law is overseen by three Ministry of the Interior committees covering approval of systems, equipment and training schools.
All alarm companies with fewer than five employees must pay the ministry the equivalent of £8,300 and other companies must pay £16,000. This is a reserve for possible future fines … needless to say, not popular with the companies! Products are lab tested and Ministry-approved or rejected. Only approved systems can be used to transmit calls to ARCs.
Technicians undergo at least 45 hours of installation/maintenance training. Certificates issued and updating is required every five years. The training requirement ensures only qualified personnel install systems.
If a user does not attend an activated alarm within 30 minutes the police can stop it by any means …If an alarm rings for no reason the police can demand the alarm company checks it within 24 hours … If a system gives 3 false calls in 12 months it is taken under the control of a State body, subjected to checks, updated if necessary and only handed back to the alarm company if its free of false calls for at least three months.
Products and security companies meet strict criteria laid down by VdS, a governing body.
Products and complete security systems have to undergo testing. Once a system is approved an installer must install the system in total – not mix and match component parts from various manu-facturers before inspection, as permitted in the UK.
Alarm company staff must attend a course at the same lab where the systems are tested and are taught the correct installation methods.
There is no regular inspection of systems as in the UK. An inspection is carried out only if a user complains of poor service, too many false alarms etc. "This usually results in the company being deleted from the approved list of installers, and it is very difficult to get back on the list".
Using "Blockschloss" to set/unset alarms (see previous page) is one of the keys to the low false alarm rate, but is expensive.
The police have drawn up a comprehensive policy with which all alarm companies must comply. It covers financial stability, training of staff, suitability of premises etc.
Only three ARCs can pass calls to the police and these must be from banks and "special interest" systems. All other systems are monitored by other ARCS who pass calls to private response bodies. If police are summoned as a result of a false call, the user can be fined DM 500 (about £180).
A recent survey showed 83 per cent of users "fear the technology in the control panel and are apprehensive about using the keypad."
The same percentage feel that if they do anything other than enter their code number they will trigger an alarm or "cause some major disaster". 67 per cent said they intentionally did not read the user manual but preferred to be told by their installer how to set/unset the panel.
92 per cent said that in the event of a message being displayed on the panel they would not read it but would call the ARC. The Italian industry hopes these fears will be overcome as more people use cellular phones, computers and ATMs.
Users prefered an electronic key used outside the premises to set/unset. First response is carried out by private security companies.
Sweden: Tarnished model!
A joint effort between installers, police and ARCs established the A/B alarm principle.
When a detector in an alarm activates a signal is sent to the ARC (the "B" alarm). The ARC will only inform the user that there has been an activation at the premises. If a second signal from a different detector is received within 30 minutes of the first it is termed the "A" alarm and police are informed. If a second signal is not received in that time no action is taken.
In Stockholm 15,000 users were offered the chance to upgrade in 1997: Of 115,000 calls, 9,900 were classed as "A" alarms and passed to police. 2,700 were cancelled within five minutes, leaving 7,200. Of these 2,700 (31 per cent) were related to crime "a very high detection rate". The result was that police actions had been reduced by more than 90 per cent! Delegates heard that this "mirrors the UK model" apart from the five minute cancellation.
However, since 1997 the situation has changed dramatically "with the possibility of chaos within the industry". Despite (or because of) the success of the system, police have now decided not to respond to confirmed alarms – apart from banks and high risk sites, leaving the vast majority of response to private companies.
Source
Security Installer
Postscript
The seminar at the Hilton, Bromsgrove, heard presentations from John Finney, Technical Manager, BSIA; Alex Carmichael, Deputy Technical Manager, BSIA; Tony Lamb, MD, Castle Care-Tech Ltd; and Brian Daley, Sales Director, Bee Tee Alarms Ltd.
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