While the immediate purpose of intruder alarms is aimed at reducing the risk of burglary and aiding criminal arrests, the reduction of false alarms has become an end in itself. Mike Cahalane argues that, for a host of reasons, any reduction must be designed to retain police response rather than being passed on to the private sector.
The contribution that intruder alarm systems have made to the socio-economic fabric of the UK in reducing burglary, insured and uninsured loss and the fear of crime – together with a parallel reduction in the cost of policing – has forever been undervalued. The reason for that is quite simple. False alarms – and statistics tell us there are plenty of them – have always hidden the benefits.

Despite the best efforts of many within and without the industry, ensuring that the police only respond to genuine alarms is not only impracticable but is slowly becoming destructive of the very purposes that intruder alarm systems providers – and the police – share as common objectives

Those objectives? Of course, we're talking about the prevention of burglary and robbery, and the subsequent arrest of criminals.

Cuts in police resources made by the Treasury have meant that manned guarding contractors are now being touted as an alternative response mechanism. When combined with licensing of contract security officers under the Private Security Industry Act, it's likely that these monetary handcuffs will only encourage that transfer of duties.

If commerce, industry and the community at large are obliged to turn to the private sector, however, the cost of a response service is likely to be far higher than anything presently contemplated.

There's no doubt that the statutory regulation of manned services is essential if public – and, indeed, end user – confidence in such a move is to be contemplated, let alone harnessed. Even then, there would be grave doubts as to the ability of guarding contractors to provide false alarm coverage outside of the larger metropolitan cities, and/or to deliver response times matching those currently available from the police.

The manned services approach is likely to see keys to premises carried aboard vehicles, which are more than likely to be driven by a lone security officer. This will introduce a further security hazard, rendering such vehicles an ideal target for criminals otherwise deterred by effective security systems for hqs, warehouses and shops, etc. Rather than improving matters for insurers and the insured, private response would most likely raise more serious issues in terms of liability and claims.

A cost that can be recovered
The public pays for a national police service.

A service that is diminished by those who abuse it with continual false alarms ('Prepare to be alarmed by verification', Security Management Today, January 2002, p42). If the police were obliged – by Treasury and Home Office financial constraints – to withdraw response altogether regardless of need, there would be a significant reduction in police manpower and the service's associated resource structure.

The statutory regulation of manned services laid down in the Private Security Industry Act is essential if public – and, indeed, end user – confidence in such a move is to be harnessed. Even then, there would be grave doubts as to the ability

There would also be other, equally less palatable consequences. The principles and statutory obligations of Best Value would be compromised. Crime reduction programmes could not then be co-ordinated nationally with local authorities. The arrest and processing of criminals could not be effectively replaced by private security companies. The detection and preservation of evidence for the courts would be seriously compromised. And the relationship between the police and the public it serves would be undermined still further.

Charging for false alarms has several advantages. It places the cost of response where it really belongs, and values the contribution made by the responsible 75% of intruder alarm holders and their service providers. It also ensures that those who abuse the system end up funding the police service with appropriate resources to do the job.

The ACPO 2000 policy seeks to cover only administration costs arising from the Unique Reference Numbers (URNs). Set at £30, if applied to the existing 844,000 remote signalling systems this brings in an annual income of roughly £25 million. However, the national cost of police response works out at more than £94 million. This one-off £30 charge, then, fails to address the recurrent cost of providing police response, leaving a shortfall in revenues of nearly £70 million.

Imposing an 'across-the-board' charge for all user URNs is not just bureaucratic, it's an example of inefficient budgeting and disregard for the customers. Most importantly, it's unfair to those end users who do not contribute to the false alarm problems in UK plc, as it singularly fails to focus on the 25% who do.

Like ACPO 2000 or loathe it, the police service simply could not continue providing free false alarm response to a select community that boasts – in most instances – the benefit of insurance cover. The insurers benefit doubly. They obtain premium income, and their risks are covered by the state at no cost to them.

It's worth remembering the principle of insurance. Namely that the bad fortune of the few is paid for by the good fortune of the many. The many are paying for police response for the benefit of insurers, of those they insure, and of self-insured businesses and corporations. In such circumstances, providing police response is not equitable (even if it were the case that police budgets weren't feeling the squeeze).

Should the police charge for false alarm call-outs? Yes, they should, but the charge ought to fall on those who are the cause. Charging the 25% of end users responsible for 100% of all false alarms will enable the police to continue its response mechanisms, and at the same time retain the ability to fund all those other vital areas of policing that the public pays for (and looks to the Government to underwrite).