In the end, Camden's ALMO was dealt a swift and decisive blow, when last week tenants voted against it three to one. The post-mortem examination shows that it never really stood much of a chance. It was saddled with a seemingly ambiguous council which, until the last minute, was arguing for direct government funding.
Camden's decision to ballot tenants, some might say, exposed it to unnecessary risks. Though balloting is supposed to ensure greater democracy, it immediately becomes a potential scalp to those who oppose change.

Defend Council Housing fought a vigorous campaign while the council played a very straight bat, as the rules demand – and we all know who emerged victorious.

Camden, of course, may have been a victim of its own success: it is, after all, a three-star council. Alternatively, given that only a third of tenants voted, it could have been apathy that killed off the ALMO idea. Or was it that the government never really gave a clear answer to the question repeatedly posed by Defend Council Housing: "If £283m of additional investment would be available to an ALMO, why can't you give itdirectly to the council?"

The government finds this question hard to answer because it has never been entirely explicit about the future of ALMOs. One suspects that it simply isn't sure. Is the purpose of ALMOs a little more autonomy to provide better service, and nothing else? Or are the aspirations for ALMOs ultimately much higher?

Camden has exhausted the government’s menu for obtaining extra cash to meet the decent homes standard

Proposals in the new Housing Bill could start to pave the way for the higher-performing ALMOs to bid for social housing grant. So, is the implicit idea that ALMOs will become more like housing associations and help take capital expenditure on housing off the public sector borrowing requirement? If the government's aspiration is simply more autonomy, then again the "no" campaigner may argue anyway that three-star council tenants are already getting that. If government declared its aspirations for ALMOs were more radical, then that could be used by its opponents to argue that they were no more than transfers by the back door.

This ALMO's demise certainly leaves Camden and the government in a quandary. The council has exhausted the government's menu for obtaining the extra cash to meet the decent homes standard; the government is left with a gaping hole exposed in its housing policy.

This is not another Birmingham. ALMOs have genuinely invigorated the council sector and are a much more popular route for councils and their tenants than stock transfers might have been. And councils currently bidding for ALMO status have not been scared off by Camden's experience in the way metropolitan councils gave up on stock transfer. But if councils could get the cash directly, would that suddenly be more attractive?