Herb Pelham explains why he thinks commercial security as a business function is nearly non-existent in Korea.
The major reason commercial security is not appreciated in Korea is that most of the world's security experts do not understand Korea, and most Korea experts — including Koreans themselves — do not understand security, or at least the full range of security. This is especially true of commercial or industrial security. Why is this the case?

Let's examine first who the security "experts" really are. Most companies, foreign and domestic, do not even have a corporate security function in Korea. Many foreign companies have a corporate security officer at their headquarters, whether that be in Cincinnati, Ohio, or Frankfurt, Germany. They tend to be former police or security officials who retired from federal agencies or the state or local police force, and sometimes the military. That means their frame of reference is usually the United States or another western country.

Their skills and experience adapt quickly to the commercial sector, but the predominant business security concerns in North America and Europe, now and in the recent past, focus on the risks posed by drug abuse, theft, pilferage, and workplace violence. Although axiomatic to any basic security program anywhere, none of these are of particular concern in Korea. Consequently, the conclusion reached by many of these veteran corporate security types, now in charge of multi-national companies' global security requirements, is that Korea, when compared to their interests in the US, Mexico, Germany, and, let's say Columbia, is a relative haven from these types of problems. Hence, low threat, low concern, low security posture.

The problem is that they, and even some of their company's executives in Korea, do not recognise that while the violent crime and physical security threat is relatively low, these traditional security problems — the ones the US based "experts" understand quite well — have been replaced with other, potentially disastrous ones. This leads us to an examination of the Korea "experts."

Who are the "experts"?

Who are the Korea "experts" and what is it that they do not understand? Anyone who has lived in Korea for any length of time (ergo, an "expert") recognises the concerns expressed by everyone about problems in the lack of transparency in financial dealings, the questions about the state of quality, particularly in construction, as well as kickbacks, fraud, corruption and a variety of practices that most Koreans themselves decry.

Many people, including foreigners have come to expect — if not accept — this phenomenon as part of the culture, and even flirt with playing the "game" themselves. One can frequently hear "when in Rome..." passed around. Other foreign companies simply look the other way while their profits are eroded by unethical practices or resign themselves to operating at a disadvantage which they believe to be too deeply ingrained to combat.

Some fight back, but find the obstacles insurmountable. This resignation, or ignorance, is because there is little recognition that security as a discipline is considerably broader than just guards, alarms and locks. Further, the threat of economic crimes, while present in the US and Europe, are much less frequent than in Asia, and certainly Korea, in particular. In essence, one could argue that violent crime and economic crime are inversely proportional to each other in this environment compared to the West.

The boundaries of security

So, if there is more to commercial security than merely the physical protection of assets, what are the boundaries? To illustrate the narrowness of security thinking by most people, it would be like believing that the only illness that exists is the flu, and doctors can only treat the symptoms of that illness. Actually, commercial security means the protection of all of a company's assets from all of the threats. It is interesting that even Koreans themselves refer to the consensus number one problem in Korea — economic crimes such as fraud and corruption — as the "Korean Disease."

The Korea "experts" know only too well how prevalent this disease is, but many erroneously assume they have to live with it. There are, in fact, remedies available in the commercial security discipline. You don't have to accept the degrading factors as part of the local culture, and you certainly don't have to flirt with violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to survive in this environment.

The Korea “experts” know only too well how prevalent this disease is, but many erroneously assume they have to live with it.

The physical security industry

So, there are entirely other areas of security in existence, perhaps the very ones in Korea with which you ought to be most concerned. But how good is the quality of security in the areas that we do know exist — namely, physical security?

The answer requires only that you think about the quality of security guard services as we see them everyday. They appear to be dominated by elderly, often untrained men who seem to do everything other than security? Of course, there are some notable exceptions, but for the most part, the industry, while populated with mature men, is itself, in its infancy.

To make matters worse, there is seldom any scientific methodology involved in the application of manned and unmanned security systems. Security should be designed and integrated, not just an uncoordinated collection of hardware and people. It is quite common for companies to be inadequately covered, or conversely, have more expensive security than that which would be consistent with the threat, or the wrong mixture of hardware and people.

The companies that install the systems often do not even know where to begin in assessing the threat, or even that security should be threat driven at all. An incident which occurred in mid-March, 1998, illustrates how the threat and vulnerabilities are usually not assessed. A burglar broke into the War Museum in the Yongsan area of Seoul at night by scaling the wall and managed to enter, steal a handgun, and subsequently hold up a bank, firing several rounds. There was no CCTV or intrusion detection system at the museum.

Obviously, these and other vulnerabilities at the museum are now evident to everyone. Conversely, some customers actually purchase too much equipment.

One other indicator of the state of the security industry is the fact that international industrial security standards are just now beginning to be introduced in Korea. The world's leading professional association is the American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS), which despite its name is the leading international body. ASIS, now over 40 years old, has just formed a Korean chapter.

Another measurement is the lack of existence of professional certifications of security people in Korea. ASIS certifies its expert members as Certified Protection Professionals (CPP). It is to security what the CPA is to accounting. To date, there are some 4000 people certified worldwide, including dozens in some of the world's lesser developed nations. However, there are virtually none in Korea, except for a few expatriates. This important professional achievement will undoubtedly be more common here in the future.

Security in context

Commercial security in Korea primarily offers a very limited array of services, ironically, often only those deployable against the risk least likely to degrade your company. Moreover, even these measures should be closely examined to determine if they are really effective and in the right proportion.

Security threats

Threats to commercial security in Korea are varied and many, but here are the major ones:
  • People
  • Monies
  • Equipment and supplies
  • Proprietary information
  • Trade secrets
  • Communications - Guards, alarms and locks cannot accomplish the safeguarding of these alone, and in some cases, almost not at all. Threats to these assets against which physical security features deployed in isolation are, at best, minimally effective include:
  • Internal theft (The majority of loss is from a company’s own employees.)
  • Embezzlement
  • Kickbacks and bribery
  • Industrial espionage and wiretapping, and electronic eavesdropping
  • Fraudulent resumes/CVs
  • Unscrupulous vendors
  • Cash register manipulation
  • Credit card fraud
  • Fictitious claims and/or voucher inflation
  • Corporate dirty tricks
  • Hostile labour instigation
  • Natural and man-made disasters